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  INTRODUCTION   
We contend that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Rules) should be interpreted in a distinctive fashion, despite 
the federal courts’ proclivity to interpret the Rules as if they 
were statutes. The Supreme Court itself promulgates the 
Rules. Congress does not enact them as statutes through the 
traditional path of bicameralism and presentment. As a result, 
the principle of legislative supremacy and the related notion 
that the federal courts should serve as a faithful agent of Con-
gress, which undergird every traditional theory of statutory in-
terpretation, do not apply in the Rules context. Unlike statuto-
ry interpretation, Rules interpretation is not an interbranch 
endeavor, but rather an intrabranch one. The Rules, therefore, 
require an interpretive theory that is descriptively and norma-
tively grounded within this non-legislative framework. That 
said, rule-of-law norms demonstrate that the Rules are authori-
tative and that they are generally interpretable from a perspec-
tive that we call “jurisprudential purposivism.” From these in-
sights, we draw several conclusions: namely, the Rules should 
not be interpreted as if they are statutes; the nascent non-
statutory theories of civil rules interpretation are inadequate; 
and an administrative law approach presents the best interpre-
tive vision for the Rules. While our proposed model may not be 
the last word on the subject—indeed, we hope it is not—we in-
tend it to be the beginning of sustained judicial and scholarly 
inquiry in the distinctive field of civil rules interpretive theory. 
While statutory interpretation was once considered an 
overlooked or underappreciated area of scholarly inquiry,1 this 
has dramatically changed over the past several decades. Partly 
as a result of Justice Scalia’s intellectual interest in the subject, 
his intense preferences on the matter, and his advocacy of a 
distinctive approach,2 there has been a revival of interest in 
 
 1. See Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and 
the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983). 
 2. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
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statutory interpretation theory.3 This has resulted in what 
some scholars have dubbed “the interpretation wars,”4 which 
generally pit different variations of “the new textualism” 
against approaches falling somewhere within the “purposivism” 
camp.5 Because mainstream judges and scholars seem to have 
assimilated key lessons from both of these perspectives (and 
the theories may therefore be converging in practice),6 the most 
recent literature seeks to assess the current views and practic-
es of the courts,7 identify existing similarities and remaining 
differences between textualist and purposivist theories,8 and 
recognize the differences that exist within each of the broad 
umbrellas of textualism and purposivism.9 
Unfortunately, the lavish attention devoted to statutory in-
terpretation has not been replicated for interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10 This is an important omis-
 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
 3. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival 
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 244 (1992). 
 4. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 117, 119 (2009) (“The latest move in the interpretation wars . . . 
is to declare something of a truce.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How 
Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 881 (2015) (“The debate 
over how courts do and should interpret statutes has narrowed to two primary 
interpretive approaches: textualism and purposivism.”). 
 6. See generally Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (arguing that it is “time for us to put the 
textualism-purposivism debate behind us”). 
 7. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Inter-
pretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 
YALE L.J. 1750 (2010) (analyzing state courts’ approaches to modern statutory 
interpretation); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 
113 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s recent interpretive approach); Richard M. 
Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407 (2015) (analyzing Supreme 
Court cases using text, pragmatism, and purpose in interpretation). For ex-
amples of recent empirical work, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 119 (2009); Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (2010). 
 8. Compare Molot, supra note 6, at 29–59, with John F. Manning, What 
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006). 
 9. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 7 (describing different views of 
purposivism espoused by Supreme Court Justices); Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades 
of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL. 309 (2014). 
 10. There are just a handful of important exceptions to this rule. See Jo-
seph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme 
Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 720 (1988) (arguing that courts should take an expansive view 
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sion because federal courts must interpret the Rules in literally 
every civil case, and the Rules also serve as a model for most of 
the states.11 
And just as in contested statutory cases, interpretive ap-
proach matters in Rules cases—a lot. Take, for example, the 
case of Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group.12 
Here, “the District Court imposed a Rule 11 sanction in the 
amount of $100,000 against [the law firm of] Pavelic & LeFlore 
on the ground that the [underlying copyright infringement] . . . 
claim had no basis in fact and had not been investigated suffi-
ciently by counsel.”13 The issue for the Supreme Court was 
whether Rule 11, as then drafted, permitted the entry of sanc-
tions only against the attorney who signed the relevant plead-
ing or whether Rule 11 embraced discretion for the district 
court to enter sanctions against the entire firm to which the 
signing attorney belonged.14 The majority approached Rule 11 
as it would “with a statute” and applied a new-textualist meth-
odology that focused on the “plain meaning” of the text.15 The 
Court concluded that the district court could not, consistent 
 
of Rules interpretation); David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Meth-
odology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927 (advo-
cating an institutional approach to Rules interpretation); Karen Nelson Moore, 
The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1993) (proposing an activist approach to Rules inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2015) (analyzing the methodologies of Rules interpreta-
tion by the Roberts Court); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: 
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 
(2002) (arguing for constrained judicial interpretation of the Rules); see also 
Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Institutional Competence and Civil 
Rules Interpretation, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 64 (2016) [hereinafter Mul-
ligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence]; Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen 
Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012) [hereinafter Mulligan & 
Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure]. 
 11. As a point of perspective, Twombly has already been cited over 
250,000 times, which is more than ten times the citations for Brown v. Board 
of Education, a much older case. Porter, supra note 10, at 124 n.3; see also 
Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 
710 (2016) (discussing the large formal and informal influence of the Federal 
Rules on state practice). 
 12. 493 U.S. 120 (1989). 
 13. Id. at 122. 
 14. Id. at 121. 
 15. Id. at 123 (“We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain 
meaning, and generally with them as with a statute, ‘[w]hen we find the terms 
. . . unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citations omitted)). 
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with the text of Rule 11, hold law firms liable for sanctions.16 
Justice Marshall in dissent, along with the lower courts, took a 
purposive approach to interpreting Rule 11.17 From this differ-
ing interpretive vantage point, these jurists readily concluded 
that firm-wide sanction was consistent with Rule 11 because 
“[o]ne of the fundamental purposes of Rule 11 is to strengthen 
the hand of the trial judge in his efforts to police abusive litiga-
tion practices and to provide him sufficient flexibility to craft 
penalties appropriate to each case.”18 
Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.19 also il-
lustrates the import of Rules interpretive theory. Here, the de-
fendant filed a Rule 50(a) sufficiency-of-the-evidence motion at 
the close of plaintiff ’s case in chief, yet failed to renew this mo-
tion after the verdict per Rule 50(b).20 The question for the 
Court was whether the court of appeals had the power to re-
view the district court’s Rule 50(a) order on appeal.21 Looking to 
the texts of Rules 50(a) and 50(b) as if they were statutory pro-
visions, and giving especially strong weight to precedent as it 
typically does in statutory interpretation,22 the Court held that 
the court of appeals lacked the power to consider an appeal of 
the Rule 50(a) motion in the absence of a Rule 50(b) motion.23 
Justice Stevens, dissenting, found that the court of appeals re-
tained the power to consider such an appeal.24 Justice Stevens 
broadly distinguished the Rules “as procedure in which we may 
have special expertise” from statutes where the Court has “an 
overriding duty to obey . . . commands that unambiguously ex-
press the intent of Congress.”25 To that end, he opined that the 
Court should take a “spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure [approach that] favors preservation of a court’s power to 
 
 16. Id. at 125–26. 
 17. Id. at 126 (describing the lower court’s heavy reliance on the policies 
underlying Rule 11); id. at 129 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he 
purposes of the Rule support this construction of Rule 11,” which would allow 
for firm-wide sanctions). 
 18. Id. at 127. 
 19. 546 U.S. 394 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 396. 
 21. Id. at 399. 
 22. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 
1364–68 (1988). 
 23. Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 400–01. 
 24. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. 
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avoid manifestly unjust results” rather than a narrow, text-
driven approach.26 
Alongside cases of this nature, there is an additional set of 
decisions in which, under the guise of interpretation, the Su-
preme Court has set a new policy course for the federal judicial 
system.27 These change-in-policy cases—such as Harris,28 Wal-
Mart,29 Twombly,30 and Iqbal31—are now familiar to students of 
federal procedure for both the substantial changes in practice 
that have been wrought as well as the questions of interpreta-
tion that have been raised.32 In each instance, the Court simply 
had a different policy preference than the position adopted by 
the Advisory Committee or what had been embodied in prior 
interpretations of the relevant Rule. In each case, the Court 
chose to exercise its power in adjudication to render an “inter-
pretive” about face. 
These examples show that interpretive stances—whether 
involving textualism, purposivism, adherence to policy set by 
the Advisory Committee, or a dynamic approach to setting pro-
cedural policy—drive outcomes in Rules cases and profoundly 
impact the conduct of federal litigation generally. Much rides 
on these interpretive-stance driven decisions: should courts be 
free to consider the credibility of video evidence in a summary 
judgment posture;33 may workers form a nation-wide class to 
sue their employer;34 may defendants be compelled to undergo 
medical examinations over their protest?35 And we could go on 
and on. Simply ignoring interpretative approaches to Rules 
cases as an afterthought, which has been the predominant 
practice, is no longer a sustainable position. 
In prior work, we took up this interpretive-approach ques-
tion and argued that the Supreme Court acts as an administra-
tor in the field of civil procedure, borrowing lessons from ad-
ministrative law to articulate a distinctive approach to Rules 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Porter, supra note 10, at 136–42. 
 28. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 29. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 30. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 31. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 32. See infra notes 61–71 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly). 
 33. Harris, 550 U.S. at 378–81. 
 34. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345. 
 35. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109 (1964). 
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interpretation.36 In developing this position, we took for granted 
Justice Frankfurter’s insight that “[p]lainly the Rules are not 
acts of Congress and can not be treated as such,”37 without 
providing a theoretical justification for this position. We return 
to defend this fundamental assumption in this piece. 
Here, we turn to first principles and provide a comprehen-
sive argument for the position that the Rules demand a distinc-
tive theory of interpretation. We also claim that our proposed 
administrative model is the best available alternative. We 
therefore view this project as a “prequel” to our prior work on 
this subject, in the sense that it provides the theoretical back-
ground for our proposals, as well as the fundamental rationale 
for recognizing civil rules interpretive theory as a distinct field 
of inquiry that is worthy of greater attention. Thus, even if one 
rejects our specific administrative law interpretive approach, 
we think that the point that the Rules require a unique inter-
pretive framework is unassailable and should significantly 
change the conventional understanding of civil rules interpre-
tation. 
We tackle this project in three broad steps. In Part I, the 
heart of our argument, we contend that the Rules should not be 
treated as if they are statutes for purposes of interpretive theo-
ry. Here, we first note that while the Court is not consistent, it 
most often interprets the Rules just as it would a statute. We 
turn next to rejecting the soundness of this “blackletter view” 
both on descriptive grounds and, more importantly, on norma-
tive grounds. On the normative point, we show that all theories 
of statutory interpretation begin with a key separation-of-
powers principle that the courts must respect legislatively en-
acted law. This point, however, is inapplicable in the Rules con-
text as the judiciary itself crafts the Rules—not Congress. This 
does not mean, however, that the Rules lack authority. Draw-
ing upon legal process theory, we contend that rule-of-law 
norms and the principles of institutional settlement and insti-
tutional advantage cement the authoritative nature of the 
Rules. 
In Part II, armed with this newly explicated normative 
foundation for the authoritative nature of the Rules, we turn to 
the two nascent, non-Rules-as-statutes interpretive approaches 
 
 36. Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, 
at 1194–1205. 
 37. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). 
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in the scholarly literature. We look first to the inherent author-
ity model, which contends that because the federal courts cre-
ate the Rules they should be free to interpret them with little 
textual restraint. We reject this approach on both rule-of-law 
and institutional-settlement grounds. We turn next to the re-
gime-specific purposive model, which contends that, unlike 
statutes, the Rules come with a regime-specific commitment to 
a purposive, as contrasted with a neo-textualist, approach to 
interpretation. While we find much to admire in this view, we 
ultimately reject it as it fails to account for the essential choice-
of-policymaking-form question that the Supreme Court faces in 
Rules cases and fails to embrace the institutional advantages of 
court rulemaking in procedural policy setting. 
In Part III, we present and defend a refined version of our 
administrative law model of Rules interpretation. Because the 
Court acts much like an agency in relation to the Rules, we ar-
gue that it should interpret the Rules in an agency-like man-
ner. By this, we mean it should pay special attention to the in-
stitution that is making Rules decisions, i.e., the lower courts, 
the Advisory Committee, and the Court itself in adjudication.38 
Moreover, the Court should route Rules issues to the institu-
tion best suited to resolve the issues raised. To this end, we ar-
gue that individual exercises of discretion and equity should be 
resolved by the lower courts. Matters of broad policy change, we 
contend, should be resolved by the Advisory Committee. Final-
ly, we assert that matters of purposive textual interpretation, 
which includes the setting of equitable standards as expres-
sions of the Advisory Committee’s textual commitments, should 
be set by the Supreme Court as an adjudicator. After address-
ing potential objections to our view, we conclude that our model 
best respects rule-of-law norms and the principle of institution-
al settlement and makes the fullest use of the various institu-
tional advantages relevant in Rules cases. 
I.  CIVIL RULES INTERPRETATION AS A DISTINCTIVE 
FIELD OF INQUIRY   
In this Part, we defend our primary thesis that interpreta-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a distinct en-
deavor from statutory interpretation. We begin by explaining 
 
 38. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004) (providing an extensive analysis of the policymaking 
options available to agencies). 
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that, rather than formulating a coherent theory of Rules inter-
pretation, the Supreme Court has either reflexively treated the 
Rules as if they were statutes or exercised free-wheeling policy 
discretion in Rules cases.39 We turn next to argue that the fa-
miliar debates regarding statutory interpretation, which all 
rest upon separation-of-powers principles, cannot simply be 
transferred to the intrabranch context of Rules interpretation. 
After briefly reviewing the process by which the civil rules are 
promulgated, we contend that legal process theory and rule-of-
law norms support the authoritative nature of the Rules and 
supply a better normative foundation for any civil rules inter-
pretive theory than do legislative-supremacy-linked theories of 
statutory interpretation. 
A. THE COURT’S VACILLATING APPROACH TO INTERPRETING THE 
RULES 
Traditionally, when the Supreme Court addresses the mat-
ter of Rules interpretation, it reflexively assumes that the 
Rules are for all practical purposes just like statutes and 
should be interpreted as such.40 Following this approach, the 
Court has often espoused a neo-textualist approach to Rules in-
terpretation. In this posture, the Court often holds that “[w]e 
give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning. 
As with a statute, our inquiry is complete if we find the text of 
the Rule to be clear and unambiguous.”41 Similarly, the Court 
will often deploy semantic and syntactic rules of statutory con-
 
 39. See Porter, supra note 10, at 131–42. 
 40. See, e.g., Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2013) 
(interpreting Rule 54(d)(1) and explaining that as “in all statutory construc-
tion cases, we ‘assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose’” (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009))); see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (noting that the Federal Rules are as “binding 
as any statute”). 
 41. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 
533, 540–41 (1991) (“‘We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain 
meaning.’ As with a statute, our inquiry is complete if we find the text of the 
Rule to be clear and unambiguous.” (quoting Pavelic 7 LeFlore v. Marvel 
Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989))); Pavelic, supra at 123 (“We give the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and generally with them 
as with a statute, ‘when we find the terms unambiguous, judicial inquiry is 
complete.’” (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)) (cita-
tions omitted)); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (us-
ing similar language); see also In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price 
Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying the Supreme Court’s tradition-
al interpretive approach). 
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struction, which tend to be heavily emphasized by neo-
textualist approaches to statutory interpretation,42 in Rules 
cases.43 Further, following this Rules-as-statutes approach, the 
Court will eschew policy-driven arguments as proper means of 
interpreting the Rules, noting that such policy questions must 
be sent to the drafters of the Rules.44 And the Court tends to 
apply a heightened stare decisis norm that is generally associ-
ated with statutory interpretation to Rules cases.45 
Consider, for example, the plurality opinion in Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
where the Justices took just such a Rules-as-statutes ap-
proach.46 In Shady Grove, New York law allowed insureds to 
collect statutory interest from insurers for late benefits pay-
ments, but under state law such interest could not be collected 
as part of a class action.47 The plaintiffs filed an action in feder-
al court, seeking to certify a class action to collect this statutory 
interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The issue for 
the Court was whether, under the Erie doctrine,48 Rule 23 di-
rectly conflicted with the New York law such that Rule 23 
 
 42. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 2, at 69–166 (identifying and de-
scribing numerous semantic and syntactic canons of statutory interpretation). 
 43. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 547–48 (2010) 
(employing textualist tools in a Rule 15 case); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius in a Rule 8 pleading case). 
 44. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (holding in a Rules 
case that “‘[w]hatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might 
wisely suggest,’ the judge’s job is to construe the statute—not to make it bet-
ter. The judge ‘must not read in by way of creation,’ but instead abide by the 
‘duty of restraint, th[e] humility of function as merely the translator of anoth-
er’s command.’” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947))); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (similar); Amchem. Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591 (1997) (similar). 
 45. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) 
(recognizing that the principle of stare decisis has “special force” in statutory 
interpretation because “Congress remains free to alter what we have done”). 
The Advisory Committee is similarly free to “correct” interpretive errors by the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, advisory committee notes to 1993 
amendments (“This provision is designed to remove the restrictions of the for-
mer rule.”). As such, the Court will often deploy stare decisis with special force 
in Rules cases. See Johnson v. Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (rely-
ing strictly upon older, even questionable post-Twombly, interpretations to re-
verse in Rule 8 pleading cases). 
 46. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 47. Id. at 397. 
 48. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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would govern under Hanna49 or whether Rule 23 could be in-
terpreted so as to avoid conflict with the New York statute.50 
The plurality interpreted Rule 23 as if it were a statute.51 In so 
doing, the plurality looked exclusively to the plain meaning of 
Rule 23’s text, deploying semantic interpretive tools, to con-
clude that Rule 23 conflicted with New York law.52 Further em-
bracing this interpretive stance, the plurality specifically es-
chewed a purposive or otherwise contextualized analysis in 
favor of this neo-textualist approach.53 Moreover, again in line 
with a Rules-as-statutes approach, the plurality concluded that 
judicial policy preferences—such as the Erie doctrine’s policy to 
avoid creating incentives to forum shop as between the state 
and federal courts—must give way to the policy set in the Rules 
(which the plurality presented as congressionally set policy).54 
Here, each interpretive stance by the Shady Grove plurality 
took a Rules-as-statutes approach. Moreover, as discussed 
above, the Court took just such a Rules-as-statutes approach in 
Pavelic & LeFlore55 and Unitherm Food Systems as well,56 as it 
has in scores upon scores of other cases. 
This statutory-centric view of Rules interpretation does not 
always carry the day, however.57 Despite the Court’s frequent 
odes celebrating a strict statutory approach to Rules interpre-
tation, it often engages with Rules cases from a decidedly non-
statutory-text perspective.58 Indeed, this policy-driven approach 
to the Rules has grabbed headlines as demonstrated by cases 
 
 49. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965). 
 50. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980). 
 51. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 400 (“Congress . . . has ultimate authori-
ty over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Porter, supra note 10, at 136 
(concluding that the plurality takes a statutory interpretive approach). 
 52. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398–400. 
 53. See id. at 405 n.7 (rejecting the dissent’s “suggest[ion] that we should 
read the Federal Rules ‘with sensitivity to important state interests’ and ‘to 
avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies’”). 
 54. Id. at 416 (“But divergence from state law, with the attendant conse-
quence of forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intend-
ed) result of a uniform system of federal procedure. Congress itself has created 
the possibility that the same case may follow a different course if filed in fed-
eral instead of state court.”). 
 55. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
 56. See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
 57. See Porter, supra note 10, at 131–42 (identifying and describing two 
distinct methodologies of Rules interpretation invoked by the Roberts Court). 
 58. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1195–97; Porter, supra note 10, at 136–42. 
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such as Harris, Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal.59 In this family 
of cases, we see the Court divorce itself from text, often almost 
entirely, and look predominately to policy.60 
Twombly presents a prime example. After decades of up-
holding the “no set of facts” standard for adjudicating motions 
to dismiss under Conley v. Gibson,61 the Court changed course 
in Twombly, an antitrust class-action suit against several tele-
communications providers.62 The complaint asserted simply 
that the defendants had colluded in violation of the antitrust 
laws but failed to provide any specific factual allegations of an 
unlawful agreement in support of that claim.63 While the plain-
tiffs’ bare allegations would have survived a Rule 12(b)(6) chal-
lenge under the well-established Conley standard,64 the 
Twombly Court charted a new course and overruled Conley.65 In 
lieu of the Conley standard, the Twombly Court required a re-
viewing court to disregard all recitals in a complaint that are 
mere legal conclusions and assess whether the well-pleaded 
factual allegations state a claim for relief that is “plausible.”66 
In effect, the opinion crafted a new and more demanding test 
for assessing the sufficiency of complaints. What is key for our 
discussion is that the Court explicitly predicated this more rig-
orous standard on its desire to avoid the high costs of discovery 
and related incentives to settle unmeritorious cases.67 
Indeed, commentators almost universally recognized 
Twombly as a pronouncement regarding the policy underlying 
 
 59. See supra notes 28–31 (citing these cases). 
 60. See Porter, supra note 10, at 149–53 (recognizing and describing this 
phenomenon). 
 61. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). The Court had regularly upheld this stand-
ard for the fifty years between Conley and Twombly. See, e.g., Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 
507 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordina-
tion Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 
466 U.S. 147, 149–50 n.3 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 
738, 746 (1976); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506 (1959). 
 62. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–50 (2007). 
 63. Id. at 565 n.10. 
 64. Id. at 561. 
 65. Id. at 563 (retiring the key passage from Conley). 
 66. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[A] complaint must con-
tain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 
 67. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59; Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. 
Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 826–27 
(2010) (reviewing Twombly). 
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pleading requirements in federal court68 and, by extension, 
state court69—not as an interpretation of Rule 8’s text. Indeed, 
proponents of the opinion welcomed it, not because of its textu-
al parsing, but rather because it limited discovery costs.70 Crit-
ics also tended to focus their discontent on the policy implica-
tions of Twombly as opposed to interpretive difficulties.71 
When the Court acts in this non-textualist mode, as in 
Twombly, it offers little commitment to stare decisis norms of 
the type one expects in the statutory interpretation arena.72 In 
an entire series of cases, from the use of video evidence on 
summary judgment to certification of class actions, the Court’s 
interaction with the Rules can hardly be described as the 
straightforward exercise of statutory interpretation—at least 
not with a straight face.73 Importantly, the Court has not pro-
vided any principled explanation for deviating from its tradi-
tional statutory approach to Rules cases, or even acknowledged 
that it is adopting a fundamentally different interpretive meth-
odology.74 
 
 68. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the 
same). 
 69. For examples of how state high courts have responded to Twombly 
and Iqbal, see Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra 
note 10, at 1196 n.32. 
 70. See, e.g., Mark Herrmann et al., Debate, Plausible Denial: Should 
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 
142–47 (2009) (opening statement of Herrmann and Beck arguing that 
Twombly and Iqbal were properly decided in an adjudication, are correct in-
terpretations of Rule 8, and set sound policy); Lynn C. Tyler, Recent Supreme 
Court Decision Heightens Pleading Standards, Holds out Hope for Reducing 
Discovery Costs, 78 PTCJ 169 (2009). 
 71. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: 
A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); A. Ben-
jamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431; see also Mulligan & 
Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1197 & nn.35–39 
(describing these critiques and collecting sources). There were some interpre-
tation-based critiques as well. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 
53 (2008) (contending that the Court in Twombly could not possibly have 
based its decision on “legalist” principles); Marcus, supra note 10, at 974 
(“Every relevant indicator suggests that the Court misinterpreted Rule 8 in 
Twombly and Iqbal.”); Spencer, supra, at 448–50, 461–73 (2008) (detailing the 
many ways in which the Twombly rule deviates from past practice, the text, 
the intent, and the legislative history of Rule 8). 
 72. Cf. supra note 45 (describing the role of stare decisis in statutory in-
terpretation). 
 73. See Porter, supra note 10, at 136–37. 
 74. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 928 (claiming that the Court’s interpre-
tive methodology in Rules cases varies “wildly and inexplicably”); Porter, su-
pra note 10, at 142, 156 (describing “the Roberts Court’s interpretive bipolari-
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B. REJECTING THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION MODEL 
The Court’s split personality when it engages with the 
Rules presents prima facie problems. In ordinary moments, the 
Court tends to adopt a Rules-as-statutes approach. Yet there is 
a substantial minority of cases where the Court disregards this 
Rules-as-statutes approach and exercises free-wheeling policy 
discretion. Adopting a Rules-as-statutes model, as we go on to 
discuss, as a foundational theory of interpretation faces two es-
sential difficulties: one descriptive and one normative. 
First, the Rules-as-statutes approach is burdened with the 
difficulty of a descriptive disconnect from a substantial minori-
ty of the Court’s own practice. Of course, developing an inter-
pretive theory for the Rules necessarily is a normative endeav-
or.75 As such, a mismatch between normative theory and actual 
practice need not be a strike against the normative approach 
per se. Indeed, often the point of an interpretive theory is to 
steer away from past errors or misguided practices in interpre-
tation. Nevertheless, a radical departure from practice, one 
which simply paints over major swathes of the Court’s exercise 
of its policy-setting muscle, should be viewed as a strike 
against an interpretive theory of the Rules. Seeing value in this 
Aristotelian76 approach to normative endeavors such as pre-
senting an interpretive theory for the Rules,77 we take the posi-
tion that the Rules-as-statutes position’s lack of a robust de-
scriptive fit is a strike against adoption of this view. 
As such, we turn now to an examination of first normative 
principles in regard to the application of statutory interpretive 
 
ty,” and recognizing “the Court’s lack of transparency and self-reflection about 
its” disparate approaches). 
 75. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986) (characterizing 
“interpretive” theories as reflecting interacting considerations of “fit” and “jus-
tification”); Marcus, supra note 10, at 930 (“The dearth of interpretive theory 
for the Federal Rules means that the normative defense of a methodology 
must begin with the basic questions of the sort often lost in the surfeit of 
commentary on statutory interpretation.”). 
 76. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (H. Rackham ed. & trans., 
1975). 
 77. The first task in these endeavors, Aristotle argues, is to review the 
prevailing thoughts of the wise on the subject. Cf. id. at 1095a–b. Then, from 
these many views one must establish a first principle in such a manner so that 
“all the facts harmonize with” a true account. Id. at 1098b10. Then after hav-
ing harmonized the facts into a first principle, Aristotle instructs us to reapply 
it to the world. That is, Aristotle uses first principles to help shed new light 
upon current controversies, as well as to help explain why the previous at-
tempts went wrong. 
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theory to Rules cases. The first principle of statutory interpre-
tation is the concept of “legislative supremacy.”78 This principle 
recognizes that statutory interpretation involves “an 
interbranch encounter of sorts,” which “represents the legal 
moment when a court confronts the product of the legislative 
branch and must assign meaning to a contested provision.”79 As 
such, “the court must adopt—at least implicitly—a theory 
about its own role by defining the goal and methodology of the 
interpretive enterprise and by taking an institutional stance in 
relation to the legislature.”80 For similar reasons, statutory in-
terpretation necessarily implicates democratic theory and re-
lated understandings of the separation of powers that are en-
shrined in the Constitution.81 Legislative supremacy, in turn, 
reflects “the idea that the legislature has legitimate authority 
to make laws, and that the judiciary must respect that authori-
ty in making its [interpretive] decisions.”82 This principle sug-
gests that courts should serve as the “faithful agents” of the 
legislature when they interpret statutes, and that the judiciary 
is subordinate to the legislature in the making of public poli-
cy.83 “Fidelity to the legislature is thought to satisfy the de-
mands of democratic theory by allowing popularly elected offi-
cials, presumed to be accountable to their constituents, to make 
policy decisions.”84 Meanwhile, because federal judges are une-
lected and politically unaccountable, liberal democratic theory 
seeks to limit the policymaking discretion of courts by requiring 
 
 78. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legisla-
tive Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989). 
 79. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legiti-
macy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593 (1995). 
 80. Id. at 593–94. 
 81. See Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 
1686 (1988) (“Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about 
constitutional law. It must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institu-
tional roles and legitimate institutional procedures that inform interpreta-
tion.”). 
 82. Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the 
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 810 (1994) (quoting Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and 
Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, 
Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
767, 769 (1991)). 
 83. See Farber, supra note 78, at 283; John F. Manning, Textualism and 
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Redish & Chung, su-
pra note 82, at 810–11. 
 84. Schacter, supra note 79, at 594. 
  
2182 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2167 
 
them to justify their interpretive decisions as the product of the 
policy choices of elected officials.85 
The intellectual development of statutory interpretive the-
ory highlights this fundamental linkage of statutory interpreta-
tion to the notion of legislative supremacy. Traditionally, the 
principle of legislative supremacy was reflected by the 
“originalist imperative,” the idea that the animating goal of 
statutory interpretation was to ascertain and implement the 
legislature’s subjective intent.86 In the years following World 
War II and the New Deal, a rough consensus emerged in favor 
of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation that was 
exemplified by the legal process theory advocated by Professors 
Hart and Sacks.87 Instead of focusing on the legislature’s sub-
jective intent with respect to the precise question at issue, legal 
process theory sought to identify the objective purposes that a 
reasonable person would attribute to a statute and its operative 
provisions, and to determine the best way to carry out those 
purposes under the circumstances presented in each case. In 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, new textualism arose 
as a means to constrain the policymaking discretion of the judi-
ciary inherent in a purposive approach so as to better respect a 
particular understanding of the constitutional structure and 
the workings of the legislative process. The advocates of this 
view typically maintain that courts should rely primarily on 
textual sources of meaning, including the ordinary understand-
ing of the operative provisions, related parts of the same act or 
the whole code, and established canons of statutory interpreta-
tion, to ascertain the objective meaning of the statutory text to 
a reasonable user of English.88 New textualists conclude that 
this approach should be adopted by a faithful agent of the legis-
lature because “the precise lines drawn by any statute may re-
flect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, unknow-
 
 85. See Eskridge, supra note 78, at 344–45. 
 86. See Schacter, supra note 79, at 594; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 221 (2d ed. 2006) 
(“Anglo-American theories of statutory interpretation have traditionally em-
phasized legislative intent as the object or goal of statutory interpretation.”). 
 87. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE LEGAL PRO-
CESS]; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical 
Introduction to the Legal Process, in THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra, at li–cxxxvi. 
 88. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 86, at 235–36 (describing sources 
of guidance consulted by textualists). 
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able strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision 
to forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision.”89 New 
textualists will only consider a statute’s underlying purposes or 
its policy consequences in a particular case to resolve ambigui-
ty, which exists only when a court is required to choose from 
among two or more linguistically permissible meanings that 
remain after a thorough examination of a statute’s “semantic 
context.”90 
To be sure, these competing statutory interpretative theo-
ries are based on fundamentally different conceptions of de-
mocracy, the rule of law, the constitutional structure, and the 
role of federal courts.91 Textualism gives the utmost priority to 
a statute’s semantic context and the way in which a reasonable 
person who knows all of the rules of grammar and syntax 
would use words, whereas purposivism privileges a statute’s 
policy context and how a reasonable person would address the 
mischief that a statute was designed to cure.92 Thus, these lead-
ing foundational theories of statutory interpretation under-
stand the principle of legislative supremacy in different ways 
and have different conceptions of the proper role of a faithful 
agent of Congress. Nevertheless, they all agree that federal 
courts are subordinate to Congress as a policy-maker and that 
the judiciary must be able to attribute the outcomes of statuto-
ry cases in a meaningful way to “legislative choice.”93 
This first principle of statutory interpretation—i.e., attrib-
uting outcomes in particular cases to the choices of a separate 
branch of government based upon separation-of-powers 
norms—does not apply to cases involving the Rules. If statutory 
interpretation is necessarily “an interbranch encounter of 
sorts” that raises separation of powers concerns,94 this is not 
true of Rules interpretation. Rather, the Rules Enabling Act 
provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” for cases in 
 
 89. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 
2390 (2003). 
 90. Id. at 2408. 
 91. See generally Siegel, supra note 4 (describing the divergent theories); 
Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. 
REV. 209 (2015) (discussing fundamental differences between competing con-
ceptions of statutory interpretation). 
 92. See Manning, supra note 8, at 76. 
 93. See id. at 96; see also Farber, supra note 78, at 284–92 (distinguishing 
between strong and weak conceptions of legislative supremacy). 
 94. Schacter, supra note 79, at 593–94. 
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the lower federal courts.95 While much of the drafting and other 
work that goes into promulgating and amending the Rules is 
carried out by judiciary committees, the members of those judi-
ciary committees are appointed by the Chief Justice, and their 
recommendations are reviewed and must be approved by the 
Supreme Court.96 
Congress is, of course, also provided with an opportunity to 
review and potentially veto proposed rules before they go into 
effect, but we do not find that such a procedure imbues the 
Rules with the same separation-of-powers normative under-
pinnings as statutory law. In this regard, we are of the same 
mind as Justice Frankfurter. We agree with him that “little 
significance attaches to the fact that the Rules, in accordance 
with the statute, remained on the table of two Houses of Con-
gress without evoking any objection . . . [before they] came into 
force.”97 As he explained, when one compares “the mechanics of 
legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the busi-
ness of Congress” with the procedure surrounding the potential 
veto of a procedural rule, “to draw any inference of tacit ap-
proval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”98 
As he bluntly put it, “Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress 
and can not be treated as such.”99 Agreeing with Justice Frank-
furter in this regard as we do, we conclude that when federal 
courts interpret the Rules, they are presented with an 
intrabranch encounter of sorts, and as such the principle of leg-
islative supremacy is inapplicable.100 
Moreover, because the Court was formally delegated au-
thority to promulgate the Rules by Congress, it makes little 
sense to understand the Court as a subordinate policy-maker 
 
 95. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). 
 96. See infra Part I.C. 
 97. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. We believe that the structural safeguards provided by the committee 
process, including the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures described 
below, prevent this arrangement from establishing an unconstitutional dele-
gation of both lawmaking and law-elaboration authority to the same actors. 
Cf. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agen-
cy Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 618 (1996) (claim-
ing that “the core of the separation of powers doctrine includes the require-
ment of some minimum separation between lawmaking and law-exposition,” 
which is allegedly violated when courts give strong deference to agency inter-
pretations of their own regulations). 
  
2017] CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY 2185 
 
with respect to Rules issues or as a “faithful agent” of itself.101 
This is particularly true given the Court’s influence over the 
personnel on the rulemaking committees, and its obligation to 
approve of the contents of proposed rules before they can be-
come effective. Although we believe that the rule of law and a 
jurisprudential principle of institutional settlement obligate 
federal courts to follow the ascertainable decisions of the 
rulemakers,102 there is otherwise little need for the judiciary to 
attribute the resolution of interpretive problems to 
“rulemakers’ choice” or to follow “an originalist imperative” 
purely on democratic legitimacy grounds. Indeed, the Rules are 
widely understood to contain interstitial gaps, which are de-
signed to be filled by common-law forms of decisionmaking or 
the application of discretionary judgment, and thereby effec-
tively sub-delegate policymaking authority to federal courts. 
Procedural policymaking by federal courts should therefore not 
be anathema for the reasons that underlie the concept of legis-
lative supremacy, and which have guided the development of 
the leading theories of statutory interpretation.103 
We are not the first scholars to recognize that legislative 
supremacy is not the proper starting point for Rules interpreta-
tion. Joseph Bauer briefly discussed this same conclusion sev-
eral decades ago.104 Our aims here, then, are twofold. One, by 
reiterating and expanding upon this point we hope to collective-
 
 101. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the 
Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW 334 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (claiming that the fidu-
ciary duties that an agent owes to her principle is to follow “her understanding 
of her principal’s present statement of intentions,” even when the principal’s 
“preferences have changed”). 
 102. See infra Part I.D. 
 103. Some scholars have embraced judicial discretion in statutory interpre-
tation and suggested that courts should be viewed as “cooperative partners” of 
the legislature. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 75; William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). While fed-
eral courts (and especially the Court) could plausibly think of themselves as 
“cooperative partners” of the rulemakers in the context of Rules interpreta-
tion, this idea would merely beg the question of how the judiciary should im-
plement the Rules. Accordingly, we do not think that anything meaningful 
turns on adopting or rejecting this label in this context. 
 104. Bauer, supra note 10, at 720 (“In construing the Federal Rules, the 
courts are interpreting standards which the Supreme Court itself has promul-
gated. Therefore, some of the problems which occur during statutory interpre-
tation, such as ferreting out legislative intent, deferring to another branch of 
the government, or avoiding violations of principles of federalism by deferring 
to state interests, are in large measure eliminated.”). 
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ly draw renewed attention to this essential normative distinc-
tion at play in Rules cases. And two, we aim to add a normative 
foundation upon which to rest Rules interpretation in the ab-
sence of legislative supremacy that is currently lacking in the 
literature. 
Accordingly, we do not think that any of the leading foun-
dational theories of statutory interpretation, based as they are 
upon the separation-of-powers concept of legislative supremacy, 
can simply be transplanted unreflectively into the Rules inter-
pretation context. Rather, civil rules interpretive theory should 
be understood as a distinctive field of inquiry, which turns on 
the particular nature of the court rulemaking process, broader 
jurisprudential principles, and related questions of institution-
al competence. 
C. THE COURT RULEMAKING PROCESS 
We therefore turn to a brief description of the court rule-
making process, which differs substantially from the tradition-
al legislative process. Court rulemaking has evolved over time 
to become an elaborate affair that takes two to three years to 
complete.105 Congress originally enacted the Rules Enabling 
Act, which empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules 
of practice and procedure for the lower federal courts, in 
1934.106 Although the Act did not establish a committee process, 
the Court appointed a fourteen-person Advisory Committee to 
conduct the research and drafting necessary to create the origi-
nal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.107 Under the first incarna-
tion of the rulemaking process, the Court directly reviewed the 
work of the Advisory Committee and, when satisfied, reported 
the promulgated Rules to Congress,108 which could overrule any 
 
 105. See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 
AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1671–72 (1995). 
 106. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (cur-
rent version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012)). For detailed histories of the 
Rules Enabling Act and recent amendments to the rulemaking process, see 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 
(1982) (providing a detailed history of the Rules Enabling Act); Struve, supra 
note 10, at 1103–18 (reviewing the then-most recent amendments to the rule-
making process). 
 107. See Order, Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Eq-
uity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935) (initially appointing the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee); see also Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936) (replacing a commit-
tee member and renewing the Advisory Committee’s charge). 
 108. See Act of June 19, 1934, § 1. 
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of the proposed rules by exercising the “legislative veto” built 
into the 1934 Act during the specified “report-and-wait peri-
od.”109 While the Court routinely deferred to the Advisory 
Committee’s proposals during this early period,110 it did on oc-
casion exercise its authority to revise Advisory Committee pro-
posals prior to submission to Congress.111 
Since the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, the 
Rules drafting process is more open to public participation, 
while at the same time more reticulated.112 The current version 
of the Rules Enabling Act mandates the use of an advisory 
committee.113 Unlike past committees dominated by practition-
ers, the committee is now made up of seven federal district 
court judges, one federal appellate court judge, one state-court 
judge, four practitioners, one representative from the Depart-
ment of Justice, and one academic.114 The current act also re-
quires the Judicial Conference to publish its procedures for 
amendment and adoption of Rules;115 to conduct open and pub-
licly noticed meetings, record the minutes, and make those 
minutes publicly available;116 to submit proposed amendments 
for public comment;117 and to attach official drafters’ notes to 
Rule proposals.118 
The current rulemaking process comprises seven steps,119 
which is now very much a bottom-up approach to rulemaking.120 
 
 109. See id. § 2. 
 110. See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme 
Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 677 (1975). 
 111. See Struve, supra note 10, at 1106 n.11. At least once, the Court exer-
cised its rulemaking authority directly in amending a Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure, bypassing the Advisory Committee entirely. See Charles E. Clark, The 
Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC. 250, 257 (1963). 
 112. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2075). 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b). 
 114. See Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Re-
porters, (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/committee-roster 
.pdf. 
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1). 
 116. Id. § 2073(c)(1)–(2). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. § 2073(d). 
 119. See Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference 
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 195 F.R.D. 386 (2000) [here-
inafter Rulemaking Procedures]. 
 120. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 
WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 913–17 (2002) (describing top down versus bottom up ap-
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First, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts col-
lects recommendations for new Rules or amendments from the 
public, practitioners, and judges.121 These suggestions are for-
warded to the appropriate Advisory Committee’s reporter122 
(typically a law professor assigned to each advisory committee 
to set the agenda and do the initial drafting of Rule revisions 
and explanatory notes123), who makes an initial recommenda-
tion for action to the Advisory Committee. Second, to go for-
ward with a Rules revision, the Advisory Committee must 
submit the proposed revision and explanatory note, and any 
dissenting views, to the Standing Committee in order to obtain 
permission to advance to the publication and comment peri-
od.124 Third, the Advisory Committee publishes the proposed 
revision widely, receives public comment, and holds public 
hearings.125 At the conclusion of the notice-and-comment period, 
the Advisory Committee’s reporter summarizes the results of 
the public input and presents them to the Advisory Commit-
tee.126 If the Advisory Committee finds that no substantial 
changes to the proposal are called for, it transmits the revision 
and accompanying notes and reports to the Standing Commit-
tee.127 If the Advisory Committee makes substantial changes to 
the proposed revision, it must go through another round of pub-
lic notice-and-comment.128 If it makes substantial changes to 
the proposed revisions, the Standing Committee returns the 
proposed revision to the Advisory Committee.129 If the Standing 
Committee does not make substantial changes, it sends the 
proposed revision to the Judicial Conference.130 Fifth, the Judi-
cial Conference considers proposed revisions each September, 
sending approved revisions to the Court or rejected proposals 
back to the Standing Committee.131 Sixth, the Court takes the 
proposed revisions under advisement from September to May 1 
of the following year, at which time it must transmit to Con-
 
proaches). 
 121. See McCabe, supra note 105, at 1672. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1664–65. 
 124. Id. at 1672. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1672–73. 
 128. Id. at 1673. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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gress those Rules it seeks to promulgate.132 Seventh, under the 
current law, Congress’s report-and-wait period runs another 
seven months from May 1 to December 1, at which time unal-
tered revisions to the Rules become law.133 The court rulemak-
ing process therefore results in the mandatory creation of an 
extensive rulemaking record, which is available to participants 
in the rulemaking process, members of Congress, the President, 
and the general public.134 
In practice, this approach to rulemaking has two key vir-
tues that lead to effective rulemaking. First, it promotes the 
use of empirical data in decisionmaking. As past Advisory 
Committee chair Mark R. Kravitz has noted, the Advisory 
Committee is “committed to gathering empirical data about the 
operation of the rules and any proposed rule changes so that we 
better understand the likely effect of rule revisions.”135 Moreo-
ver, the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the judici-
ary, works with the Advisory Committee to supply empirical 
studies of Rules issues.136 Second, the legal community engages 
actively with the Advisory Committee in notice-and-comment 
periods. For example, the December 2015 Rules amendments 
received more than 2300 comments, many of which claimed 
that the proposed amendments were biased in favor of defend-
ants.137 In part because it regularly uses sound empirical evi-
dence and subjects its recommendations to vigorous notice and 
comment, many conclude that the Advisory Committee produc-
 
 132. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2012). 
 133. Id. If Congress decides to reject or modify proposed changes during 
this period, it must promulgate a joint resolution that satisfies the constitu-
tional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 7; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983). 
 134. See Rulemaking Procedures, supra note 119, at 387–93. 
 135. Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not To Revise: That Is the Question, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 217 (2010). 
 136. See Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Con-
temporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 70 (2013); Russell 
Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Cre-
ating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 39–40 
(1988). 
 137. See Tony Mauro, Lawyers Spar over Discovery Rules; Litigation Costs 
at Center of Debate, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal 
.com/id=1202644114459/Lawyers-Spar-Over-Discovery-Rules; Rebecca L. 
Shult, 2,000+ Public Comments Submitted Responding to Proposed Changes to 
FRCP, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx 
?g=dd0982a2-7c5a-4001-8380-648939119c8a. 
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es strong, non-biased rules138 that reflect principled deliberation 
worthy of deep respect.139 
Of course, the rulemaking process is not without fault or 
critics. First, the current seven-step rulemaking process is by 
most assessments, including our own,140 overly ossified, taking 
two and a half years to promulgate rules.141 Indeed, we agree 
with Stephen Yeazell’s view that the current rulemaking pro-
cess has become overly cumbersome with little added benefit to 
the quality of the finished product.142 Second, some have cri-
tiqued its bottom-up approach as overly empowering of the Ad-
visory Committee in lieu of the Supreme Court or Congress.143 
Third, others conclude that rulemakers, at least of late, are 
overly defense biased and unduly focused on the needs of com-
plex litigation to the detriment of the bulk of ordinary cases.144 
Fourth, still others conclude that, instead of following the em-
pirical data for typical cases, the rulemakers often become 
wrongly focused on high-profile, atypical cases.145 Fifth, still 
 
 138. See Daniel R. Coquillette, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemak-
ing: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685 (1995) (discussing a report prepared by 
Thomas E. Baker and Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook). 
 139. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemak-
ing, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999) 
(defending court-based rulemaking as central to developing and maintaining 
rules that reflect principled deliberation). 
 140. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, 
at 89; Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 
1237–38. 
 141. See McCabe, supra note 105. 
 142. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 235 (1998). 
 143. See, e.g., Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The 
Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 72–73 (2010). 
 144. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking 
and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1595 
(2015) (labeling the current members as a “rulemaking committee appointed 
by a Republican Chief Justice that is dominated by judges appointed by Re-
publican [P]residents and lawyers who defend corporations/businesses”); Pa-
tricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the 
Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1144–52 (2015) (ar-
guing that the appointments to the Advisory Committee by Chief Justice Rob-
erts are biased against plaintiffs); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology 
in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 614–23 
(2001) (similar). 
 145. See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1005, 1042–43 (2016); Suja A. Thomas & Dawson Price, How Atypical Cases 
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others note that because the Advisory Committee responds to 
the practicing bar, not voters generally, it has an unfortunate 
tendency toward denying access to the judicial system.146 Sixth, 
some scholars find, akin to an agency capture argument, that 
the rulemaking process is dominated by corporate interests.147 
Consider the drafting process leading up to the 2015 Rules 
amendments as evidence that there is truth to both the claims 
of virtues and vices in the rulemaking process. The 2015 
Amendments deal predominantly with pre-trial case manage-
ment, discovery, spoliation, and cooperation among attorneys.148 
The Advisory Committee had access to a lot of data in this en-
deavor. For years, the Federal Judicial Center had found that, 
at the median, discovery is not overly expensive. It concluded 
that, again at the median, discovery cost about 1.6% of the 
stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% of the stakes for defendants in 
2009 with the median stakes coming in at $160,000.149 Indeed, 
“[n]early every effort to quantify litigation costs and to under-
stand discovery practice over the last four decades has reached 
results similar to the 2009 FJC study.”150 Nevertheless, the Ad-
visory Committee, focusing on the approximately five percent of 
cases that do have explosive discovery costs,151 and perhaps 
driven by biases attributable to the defense-centered elite Advi-
 
Make Bad Rules: A Commentary on the Rulemaking Process, 15 NEV. L.J. 
1141, 1142 (2015). 
 146. See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of 
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263 (2009). 
 147. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1015–19. 
 148. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 55, and 84 and the Appendix of Forms, 
Absent Contrary Congressional Action, 305 F.R.D. 457 (2015) [hereinafter 
Proposed Amendments]. 
 149. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NA-
TIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE 43 (2009); see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 765, 773–74 (2010) (finding that “[discovery] costs are generally propor-
tionate” to client stakes in the litigation); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Em-
pirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal 
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 525, 531 (1998) (finding similar results 
just ten years earlier); see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUS-
TICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA xxvii (1998), http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
monograph_reports/2009/MR941.pdf (“Discovery is not a pervasive litigation 
cost problem for the majority of cases.”). 
 150. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice 
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1111 (2012). 
 151. Willging et al., supra note 149, at 531. 
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sory Committee membership,152 offered an aggressive slate of 
discovery-limiting amendments in 2013.153 For example, the 
proposed 2013 changes included amendments which would 
have lowered the presumptive limits on the use of discovery de-
vices in Rules 30, 31, 33 and 36.154 In reaction, the bar aggres-
sively deployed the opportunity to participate provided by the 
notice-and-comment period. As noted above, nearly 2300 com-
ments, many critical, were submitted after the amendments 
were proposed.155 Indeed, these proposed changes were compre-
hensively addressed by pro-plaintiff groups such as the Ameri-
can Association for Justice, which opposed them in the court of 
public opinion156 and formally with the Advisory Committee.157 
Substantial changes to the proposed rules were made as a re-
sult. Indeed, the Advisory Committee withdrew all the pro-
posed presumptive limits on Rules 30, 31, 33 and 36, noting 
that “[s]uch widespread and forceful opposition deserves re-
spect.”158 Moreover, many of the other controversial proposed 
 
 152. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1016–19. 
 153. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY 
AND CIVIL PROCEDURE (2013), http://www.hib.uscourts.gov/news/archives/ 
attach/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf [hereinafter 2013 PRO-
POSAL]; see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE app. B-5 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ 
ST09-2014.pdf (noting choice to move for proportionality amendments to dis-
covery). 
 154. See 2013 PROPOSAL, supra note 153, at 300–05, 310–11. 
 155. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting numbers of com-
ments submitted). 
 156. See, e.g., Arthur Bryant, Access to Justice at Stake with Federal Rules 
Changes, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST.: FIGHTING FOR JUST. BLOG (June 5, 2014), 
https://www.justice.org/blog/access-justice-stake-federal-rules-changes; Feder-
al Courts Should Not Be Rigged in Favor of Corporations, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. 
(Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.justice.org/news/federal-courts-should-not-be 
-rigged-favor-corporations; Proposed Changes to Federal Rules Would Elimi-
nate Access to Justice, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www 
.justice.org/news/proposed-changes-federal-rules-would-eliminate-access 
-justice. 
 157. See Comments on Proposed Rules from J. Burton LeBlanc, President, 
Am. Ass’n for Justice, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Dec. 
19, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USC-RULES-CV-2013 
-0002-0372 (download pdf ). 
 158. See Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meeting at lines 466–67 
(Apr. 10–11, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV04 
-2014-min.pdf. 
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changes were not adopted.159 Of course, other proposals were 
adopted, and the jury remains out as to their impact.160 
Debating the wisdom of the 2015 amendments is not our 
goal here. Rather, our point in this brief review of the rulemak-
ing structure, coupled with an overview of its alleged strengths 
and weaknesses in practice, is to show that Justice Frankfurter 
was correct. The Rules are not statutes. They are crafted differ-
ently. The drafters face different lobbying pressures and differ-
ent procedural hurdles. They succeed, and fail, differently from 
statutes. As such, wholesale adoption of a Rules-as-statutes 
approach to interpretation, based upon a separation-of-powers 
foundation, poorly fits in the context of this particular lawmak-
ing process. 
D. A NORMATIVE FOUNDATION FOR CIVIL RULES 
INTERPRETATION 
We turn now from critique to our positive vision for the 
normative foundations of a theory of civil rules interpretation. 
While we believe that Rules interpretation is fundamentally 
distinct from statutory interpretation for the reasons described 
above, that does not mean that federal courts should be allowed 
to ignore the text and the ascertainable intent of the 
rulemakers. Because the principles of legislative supremacy 
and faithful agency are inapplicable, however, we need to pro-
vide another theoretical justification for this principle. To this 
end, we point out that the Rules are legally authoritative, from 
a legal process theory and rule-of-law perspective, once they 
have been enacted through the foregoing process, which there-
fore requires federal courts to follow the identifiable policy 
choices of the rulemakers. We believe this more applicable 
normative foundation for civil rules interpretation has several 
pragmatic consequences as well, which we discuss in Parts II 
and III. 
We turn first to a primer on legal process theory. This 
school of thought aims to promote democratic legitimacy and 
 
 159. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 148. 
 160. Compare Altom M. Maglio, Adapting to Amended Federal Discovery 
Rules, TRIAL, July 2015, at 37, 40 (“[T]he actual rule amendments do not sup-
port [the] perspective [of severe restrictions on discovery].”), with Andrew J. 
Kennedy, Significant Changes to Discovery and Case Management Practices, 
AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.justice.org/magazine/trial/ 
2015-july%E2%80%94drugs-and-devices (claiming that the rule amendments 
will cause “a sea change in the scope of discovery”). 
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respect for the rule of law by approaching legal regimes as 
structures for rational decisionmaking.161 To this end, “[i]ts cen-
tral principle was that each governmental institution possesses 
a distinctive area of competence such that specific tasks can be 
assigned to that institution without reference to the substan-
tive policies involved.”162 As a fundamental matter, then, this 
approach looks to process as a way to promote rational 
decisionmaking, with a focus upon routing decisions to fora 
holding the appropriate institutional advantage in light of the 
issue facing the decisionmaker. 
Turning to interpretation, Hart and Sacks began with the 
premise that all law is purposive in orientation, and that the 
role of the judiciary in statutory interpretation is therefore to 
ascertain the best means of carrying out the legislature’s pur-
poses. In doing so, however, courts were instructed to avoid re-
sults that could not be squared with the statutory text or other 
clearly established legal policies, and they should “assume, un-
less the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature 
was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable pur-
poses reasonably.”163 This purposive methodology essentially 
entailed the following basic steps: “(1) develop an understand-
ing of the purposes or principles of the statute, (2) evaluate al-
ternatives for action in relation to those purposes or principles, 
(3) act in ways, other things equal, that best furthers those 
purposes or principles, and (4) adopt only interpretations per-
mitted by the statute’s text.”164 However, when purposive judg-
es were confronted with problems that were likely unanticipat-
ed by the legislature, and following the plain meaning of the 
text would lead to absurd or severely problematic results, they 
would traditionally be willing to consider following the “famil-
iar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and 
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor 
within the intention of its makers.”165 
 
 161. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, 
and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996); id. 
at 1397 (“Legal process theorists accepted the prevailing notion that govern-
ment institutions act rationally to achieve their goals.”). 
 162. Id. at 1396. 
 163. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 1378. 
 164. Stack, supra note 5, at 876 (summarizing the purposive framework for 
interpretation that was articulated by Hart and Sacks); see also HART & 
SACKS, supra note 87, at 1374–80 (providing their “note on the rudiments of 
statutory interpretation”). 
 165. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
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It is important to understand that while Hart and Sacks 
set forth a purposive approach to statutory interpretation that 
is consistent with legislative supremacy and the judiciary’s tra-
ditional obligation to serve as a faithful agent of the legislature, 
The Legal Process was based on a broader jurisprudential theo-
ry of the nature of law and therefore has potentially wider ap-
plication.166 Kevin Stack has recently revisited the theoretical 
underpinnings of The Legal Process, and explained that its 
“distinctive conception of the rationality of law made [the] theo-
ry an attractive synthesis of formalist and realist thought.”167 
Unlike formalists, Hart and Sacks “recognized legal 
decisionmaking as a creative process,” and, unlike realists, they 
“understood law and legal decisionmaking as a rational enter-
prise” that is “informed by an organic relationship among legal 
rules, social policies, and ethical principles.”168 Hart and Sacks 
viewed the state as a mechanism to facilitate collective action 
that would improve social welfare and thereby promote the 
common good,169 and they therefore understood law as “a doing 
of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to 
solve the basic problems of social living . . . .”170 Because people 
who live together in a community must have some understand-
ing of how they are expected to behave, those substantive un-
derstandings “necessarily imply the existence of what may be 
called constitutive or procedural understandings or arrange-
ments about how questions in connection with both types are to 
be settled.”171 In other words, law requires procedure, and any 
legal system must also establish processes for how those proce-
dures are to be made.172 Because procedures can be well made 
or poorly designed to serve their objectives, Hart and Sacks re-
peatedly emphasized the importance of institutional compe-
tence: 
 
 166. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 
383–91 (2012) (reconsidering the premises of legal process purposivism and 
arguing that this approach should be extended to judicial interpretation of 
agency regulations); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at lxii (de-
scribing the vision of law that animated THE LEGAL PROCESS). 
 167. Stack, supra note 166, at 383. 
 168. Id. at 383 n.139 (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at lxiii). 
 169. See HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 2–3. 
 170. Id. at 148. 
 171. Id. at 3. 
 172. This is perhaps an observation that only a civil procedure professor 
could love. 
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In a government seeking to advance the public interest, each organ 
has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good govern-
ment is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out 
which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the 
institutions should interrelate.173 
At the end of the day, “[a]n organized society is one which has 
an interconnected system of procedures adequate, or claiming 
to be adequate, to deal with every kind of question affecting the 
group’s internal relations, and every kind of question affecting 
its external relations which the group can establish competence 
to deal with.”174 In short, Hart and Sacks saw a focus upon rout-
ing legal questions to the forum that holds the relevant institu-
tional advantages in relation to the issue presented as key to 
their philosophy. 
Yet, as Stack points out, contemporary scholarship tends to 
equate legal process theory with Hart and Sacks’s famous sug-
gestion that when inferring the purposes of a statute, courts 
“should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, 
that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursu-
ing reasonable purposes reasonably,”175 and to criticize the the-
ory on the grounds that this presumption is unrealistic and 
shifts too much policymaking discretion to the judiciary.176 Yet 
this caricature of legal process theory ignores the importance 
that Hart and Sacks attributed to positive sources for identify-
ing the purposes of statutes, and fails to appreciate how atten-
tion to those sources fits within their broader theory of law.177 
For starters, Hart and Sacks emphasized that “[a] formally en-
acted statement of purpose in a statute should be accepted by 
the court if it appears to have been designed to serve as a guide 
to interpretation, is consistent with the words and context of 
the statute, and is relevant to the question of meaning at is-
sue.”178 Indeed, the legal process school embraces six broad con-
cepts, all of which offer insight: (1) a focus upon institutional 
settlement; (2) a purposive approach to judicial decision-
making; (3) a commitment to rule of law; (4) a commitment to 
reasoned elaboration of enduring legal principles; (5) a special 
attention to the balancing of neutral principles that transcend 
 
 173. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at lx. 
 174. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4. 
 175. Id. at 1378. 
 176. See Stack, supra note 166, at 383. 
 177. See id. 
 178. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 1377; see also Stack, supra note 166, 
at 384–88 (providing a careful description of “the purposive technique”). 
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the immediate facts of any particular case; and (6) a focus on 
the structural features of the law—such as federalism and sep-
aration of powers in the constitutional context.179 
This fuller understanding of the legal process school is es-
pecially relevant here in light of the significance of the princi-
ple of institutional settlement. Hart and Sacks characterized 
this notion as “the central idea of law” that underlies every sys-
tem of constitutive procedures.180 This principle “expresses the 
judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of 
duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding 
upon the whole society unless and until they are duly 
changed.”181 Hart and Sacks claimed that a clear understanding 
of the principle of institutional settlement eliminates many of 
the “mysteries” of jurisprudence, such as the relationship be-
tween law and morality.182 When this principle applies, “we say 
that the law ‘is’ thus and so, and brush aside further discussion 
of what it ‘ought’ to be.”183 Significantly, however, “the ‘is’ is not 
really an ‘is’ but a special kind of ‘ought’—a statement that, for 
the reasons just reviewed, a decision which is the duly arrived 
at result of a duly established procedure for making decisions of 
that kind ‘ought’ to be accepted as binding upon the whole soci-
ety unless and until it has been duly changed.”184 
The key point for present purposes is that legal process 
theory’s commitments to seeking institutional advantage in re-
solving controversies, and according proper respect to duly 
promulgated texts and the clear decisions of lawmakers follow 
from the nature of law and the principle of institutional settle-
ment, rather than the concept of legislative supremacy. These 
commitments, therefore, have potential application in the non-
legislatively crafted Rules context.185 
Moreover, the proposition that adhering to the duly prom-
ulgated decisions of authorized institutions performs an essen-
tial coordinating function in a legal system that seeks to “solve 
 
 179. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Para-
digm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 963–70 (1994). 
 180. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4; see also Stack, supra note 166, at 
389–91 (describing the principle of institutional settlement and explaining its 
importance to Hart and Sack’s jurisprudential theory). 
 181. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4. 
 182. See id. at 4–5. 
 183. Id. at 5. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Stack, supra note 166, at 390–91. 
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the basic problems of social living”186 provides a remarkably apt 
justification for the judiciary’s obligation to follow the clear 
mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Adjudication 
is, after all, a public institution that seeks to resolve disputes 
that arise within a community in a peaceful fashion, and au-
thoritative rules of procedure are plainly necessary for this in-
stitution to perform this function. The litigants, judges, and 
other participants in adjudication must have adequate guid-
ance regarding how to behave. While the Rules Enabling Act 
provides little guidance regarding their preferred content, the 
very first Rule provides that “[t]hey should be construed and 
administered . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action and proceeding.”187 Accordingly, we 
contend that the first principle of any theory of Rules interpre-
tation should be that the judiciary must follow the principle of 
institutional settlement, and that this aspect of the rule of law 
requires federal courts to follow the identifiable policy choices 
of the rulemakers.188 
*** 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require an interpre-
tive theory of their own. Although the federal courts, more of-
ten than not, default to a Rules-as-statutes approach, this posi-
tion is unsound. Every traditional theory of statutory 
interpretation takes legislative supremacy as an axiom upon 
which the theory is premised as it aims to navigate an 
interbranch encounter. Interpretation of the Rules, which are 
judicially crafted by contrast, is an intrabranch encounter. As 
such, wholesale imposition of statutory interpretive theory to 
the Rules lacks a strong normative fit. Following legal process 
theory insights, we contend that an interpretive theory for the 
Rules better rests upon a foundation of the principles of institu-
tional settlement, institutional advantage, and rule-of-law 
norms. 
Of course, the heated debates over statutory interpretation 
have demonstrated that a rough consensus on first principles 
need not preclude substantial methodological disagreement. A 
full-fledged theory of Rules interpretation also needs to address 
several trickier problems, including (1) how to identify and re-
solve ambiguities in the Rules; (2) the proper ways to facilitate 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 188. We will have more to say about precisely how this should be done later 
in the Article. See infra Part III.B. 
  
2017] CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY 2199 
 
any necessary or desirable policy changes in the operation of 
the Rules; and (3) whether and how to differentiate the meth-
ods that should be followed by the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts.189 The next Part describes the theories of Rules 
interpretation that have been suggested in the small body of 
scholarly literature on this topic, and explains how they ad-
dress the relevant problems. 
II.  SCHOLARLY THEORIES OF RULES INTERPRETATION   
While interpretation of the Rules remains woefully under-
explored, we are not the first scholars to question the Rules-as-
statutes model. We turn to the two leading families of theories 
in this part, both of which we find unsatisfying. We begin with 
the inherent-authority model, which asserts that the Court’s 
engagement with the Rules is more of a common-law-like, free-
wheeling, policy-setting endeavor than a traditional interpreta-
tive task. We reject this position as incompatible with the prin-
ciple of institutional settlement and rule-of-law norms, given 
that the Rules Enabling Act has definitively routed procedural-
policy questions to the rulemaking process. Second, we address 
the regime-specific purposive model. Unlike the inherent-
authority model, this view assumes that courts face a tradi-
tional interpretive chore in Rules cases, but contends that, un-
like statutes, the Rules come with a regime-specific commit-
ment to a purposive, as contrasted with a neo-textualist, 
approach to interpretation. While we find much to admire in 
this view, we ultimately reject it because it fails to account for 
the essential choice-of-policymaking-form question that the Su-
preme Court routinely faces in Rules cases, and it fails suffi-
ciently to embrace the institutional advantages of court rule-
making in procedural policy setting. 
A. INHERENT-AUTHORITY MODEL 
Recognizing the descriptive and normative flaws of a 
Rules-as-statutes interpretive model, several scholars are 
drawn to an unrestrained approach to Rules interpretation. 
Judge Karen Nelson Moore gives us the first complete presen-
tation of this inherent-authority view of Rules interpretation. 
 
 189. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How To 
Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (suggesting 
that it may be appropriate for higher and lower courts to follow different in-
terpretive methods based on their different institutional characteristics). 
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She contends that the Rules Enabling Act vests the Supreme 
Court with “substantial . . . powers . . . in the promulgation 
process” for the Rules190 which, when viewed in light of the 
Court’s inherent authority to set procedure, counsels for a 
“greater power to interpret Rules” than federal courts are tradi-
tionally understood to have when interpreting statutes.191 As a 
result, the plain meaning of a rule’s text need not control; in-
deed, even the intentions of the drafters should not limit the 
Court.192 She posits that the Court should feel free to “reform[] 
the Rules” through interpretation.193 Accordingly, she asserts 
that the Court should look to a rule’s broadly perceived purpose 
and consider how this purpose can best be achieved in light of 
changed conditions.194 
A related group of scholars go farther still. These commen-
tators contend that the Rules are not fully authoritative at all. 
Rather, these thinkers tend to assert that the Rules are mere 
“rules of thumb.”195 Further, these commentators often decry 
viewing rules as authoritative under the guise that this is but 
an empty formalism.196 It is fair to view these scholars as going 
even a step further than Moore insofar as they reject the need 
to engage in an interpretive act at all, while at the same time 
placing them within the same interpretive family as Moore.197 
Members of this school, then, champion the Supreme Court 
bringing substantial policy-setting change by way of atextual, 
non-stare decisis constrained, Court-determined policy. The 
basic idea is that the Court makes the rules, and the Court 
 
 190. Moore, supra note 10, at 1093; see also Bauer, supra note 10, at 729 
(“Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, . . . Congress has vested all rulemaking 
authority in the Supreme Court, subject only to a limited form of potential leg-
islative veto.”). 
 191. Moore, supra note 10, at 1093. 
 192. Id. at 1092–94. 
 193. Id. at 1109. 
 194. Id. at 1096. 
 195. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1196–97 (1994) (discussing the differences between 
“serious rules” and “rules of thumb”). 
 196. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 373 
(2000); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class 
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 351 (discussing the shortcomings of cases 
that favor formalism over due process concerns in the context of class actions 
and Rule 23). 
 197. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 941–42 (describing and rejecting this 
view). 
  
2017] CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY 2201 
 
should therefore feel free to change the rules based on policy 
considerations in a common-law fashion when it decides cases. 
The so-called summary judgment trilogy—Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,198 Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc.,199 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett200—provide a strong 
example of this type of interpretative approach. Prior to the 
trilogy, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,201 the Court interpreted 
what is now Rule 56(a)’s language in the context of a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 civil rights suit, alleging that the defendant department 
store refused to serve the white school-teacher plaintiff and her 
minor African-American students at its lunch counter, leading 
to an arrest for vagrancy. The lead plaintiff contended that 
there was state action, as required by § 1983, because the de-
partment store and the local police conspired to prevent service 
at the lunch counter.202 The district court granted summary 
judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to show evi-
dence of a conspiracy.203 Reversing, the Court interpreted “facts 
showing” as placing a duty on the defendant, as the moving 
party, to show affirmatively that no conspiracy took place.204 “If 
the existence of a conspiracy was ‘X,’ the Adickes Court held 
that Kress was required to produce affirmative evidence show-
ing ‘not-X ’ (that is, that ‘X ’ is false).”205 Thus, for a moving de-
fendant to prevail at summary judgment, the movant must 
“show” that it has undisputed evidence countering every possi-
ble avenue to a plaintiff victory at trial. 
The trilogy cases completely reversed this burden on a 
moving defendant, without a substantive change to the rele-
vant text of Rule 56. They did so by placing the burden on the 
plaintiff to produce evidence to counter a summary judgment 
motion. In the lead Celotex decision, the Court held that Rule 
56(e) requires the plaintiff to “designate ‘specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”206 The Court, thus, rein-
terpreted “facts showing” from a burden on defendants to show 
 
 198. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 199. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 200. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 201. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
 202. Id. at 148. 
 203. Id. at 153–55 & nn.8–12. 
 204. Id. at 158. 
 205. Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering 
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 81, 94 (2006). 
 206. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). 
  
2202 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2167 
 
with undisputed facts that plaintiff has no path to victory, to a 
burden on plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence to support 
their claim at the summary judgment stage.207 “In other words, 
if ‘X’ is a necessary element of the plaintiff ’s claim,” under the 
trilogy, “the defendant is not required to produce affirmative 
evidence showing ‘not-X ’; the defendant can also meet its bur-
den by showing that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to 
prove ‘X ’ at trial.”208 
Of special importance here, the Celotex decision is rooted in 
a Court-set policy preference of sparing defendants the cost of 
trial in weak cases.209 While we believe that this is a legitimate 
policy,210 we also believe that it was established by the wrong 
body. In this regard, the notion that the Celotex approach, 
which “impose[s] virtually no burden at all on the movant,”211 
squares with Rule 56(e)’s requirement that “the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”212 is 
strained—at best. As Adam Steinman has convincingly argued, 
even assuming the Celotex, Court-set goal is a good one, “it fails 
in terms of the [three] interpretive values”213 of “(1) consistency 
with prior cases; (2) consistency with the text that the decision 
purports to interpret; and (3) internal coherence.”214 As such, 
the trilogy cases exemplify the “reform the Rules through in-
terpretation” approach, which is the hallmark of the inherent-
authority view.215 As discussed above,216 this same Court-
 
 207. See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: 
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1345 (2005); see 
also EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 79–81 (2d ed. 2000). 
 208. Steinman, supra note 205, at 98. 
 209. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (“Rule 56 must be construed with due regard 
not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are ade-
quately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also 
for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in 
the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses 
have no factual basis.”). 
 210. See Redish, supra note 207, at 1343 (“[T]here exists no justification for 
imposing any burden on a movant for summary judgment that would not par-
allel the burden that party would have at trial prior to moving for judgment as 
a matter of law.”); see also BRUNET ET AL., supra note 207, at 85 (same). 
 211. Redish, supra note 207. 
 212. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 213. Steinman, supra note 205, at 111. 
 214. Id. at 107. 
 215. Id. at 109. 
 216. See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text (discussing Twombly). 
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derived-policy-over-promulgated-text approach forms the core 
of Twombly’s and Iqbal’s reconstruction of Rule 8. 
One may instructively draw parallels, even if the fit is not 
one-to-one, between Eskridge and Frickey’s dynamic approach 
to statutory interpretation and the inherent-authority model of 
Rules interpretation.217 From this perspective, the interpreter is 
not engaged in a purely historical search for legislative intent 
as exemplified by the text nor is the interpreter limited only to 
a search for the original purposes of the statute.218 Rather un-
der this view “statutory interpretation involves the present-day 
interpreter’s understanding and reconciliation of three different 
perspectives, no one of which will always control.”219 These 
three perspectives are: (1) the best understanding of the statu-
tory text itself; (2) the original legislative expectations as to the 
operation of the statute; and (3) “the subsequent evolution of 
the statute and its present context, especially the ways in 
which the societal and legal environment of the statute has ma-
terially changed over time.”220 This inclusion of prong-three and 
the evolving nature of the legal regime and its present-day ef-
fects, which is the hallmark of the dynamic approach, is more 
akin to inherent-authority common-law case synthesis than 
“traditional” statutory interpretation theories.221 As such, the 
inherent-authority view of Rules interpretation, with its focus 
on reform through interpretation, fits well as an expression of 
dynamic interpretation in the Rules context. 
Just as Eskridge argues that the dynamic theory of statu-
tory interpretation better describes the actual practice of the 
courts than does an intentionalist or purposive model,222 one 
could well conclude that the inherent-authority model (which 
effectively takes an aggressively dynamic approach to Rules in-
terpretation) is also a descriptively superior model—at least for 
a portion of the Court’s Rules cases. As Elizabeth Porter, who 
 
 217. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory In-
terpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325 (1990); 
Eskridge, supra note 78; Eskridge, supra note 103. 
 218. Eskridge, supra note 103, at 1482 (“Interpretation is not mere exege-
sis to pinpoint historical meaning, but hermeneutics to apply that meaning to 
current problems and circumstances.”). 
 219. Id. at 1483. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1481 (“[E]xplor[ing] the thesis that statutes, like the Constitu-
tion and the common law, should be interpreted dynamically.”). 
 222. Id. at 1481–82. 
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endorses the legitimacy of this approach,223 recently demon-
strated, the “Court’s procedural rulings [often eschew tradi-
tional statutory construction and] evince a contradictory mode 
of interpretation, one that is rooted less in the Rules and more 
in the Court’s inherent power of adjudication.”224 In fact, Porter 
specifically describes many of the Court’s decisions as exempli-
fying (if not going even beyond) the dynamic-interpretative ap-
proach.225 In the “headline” change-in-policy cases—such as 
Harris, Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Iqbal226—the Court simply has 
a different policy preference than the position adopted by the 
Advisory Committee or embodied in prior interpretations of the 
relevant rule.227 At least when the Court “rules from its com-
mon-law hip,” as it does often in Rules cases, this inherent-
authority model that finds roots in dynamic interpretive theory 
has much descriptive power.228 
Nevertheless, the inherent-authority model is significantly 
flawed as a generally applicable theory of Rules interpretation. 
To begin with the descriptive fit, a sole focus on the Court’s in-
herent-authority moments in Rules cases provides a false im-
pression of the Court’s overall approach. Indeed, the Court reg-
ularly embraces the Rules-as-statutes paradigm, even in recent 
years.229 As we outlined above, we conclude that the Rules-as-
statutes approach remains the “blackletter” view from which 
other approaches deviate.230 The inherent authority view, thus, 
runs contrary to the Aristotelian principle that normative 
judgments have a rich descriptive connectivity with the issues 
being analyzed.231 
More tellingly, the inherent-authority model fails norma-
tively on legal process-school grounds because the Rules Ena-
bling Act trumps the Court’s inherent authority to establish 
 
 223. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175; see also id. at 146–48 (explaining 
that the Court’s limited control over the rulemaking process makes it logical to 
use adjudication as the mechanism for implementing its own policy views de-
spite the text of a Rule). 
 224. Id. at 136. 
 225. Id. at 137. 
 226. See supra notes 28–31 (citing these cases). 
 227. See Porter, supra note 10, at 136–41. 
 228. Id. at 142. 
 229. Id. at 131–36. 
 230. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text (discussing the 
blackletter view). 
 231. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Aristo-
telian principle). 
  
2017] CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY 2205 
 
procedure. To be sure, absent congressional action, the Su-
preme Court has “certain implied powers [that] must necessari-
ly result” to the federal courts “‘from the nature of their institu-
tion,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with . . . because they 
are necessary to the exercise of all others.’”232 In the absence of 
congressional action, the setting of procedure would seem to fall 
within the scope of this inherent power. But as the Court has 
itself held, “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the 
practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that 
power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to 
make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of 
the United States.”233 
Because Congress has so strongly acted here, any attempt 
to blot out this clear delegation structure in favor of an un-
bounded inherent-authority approach to Rules interpretation 
runs afoul of institutional-settlement and rule-of-law norms. As 
Catherine Struve concludes, “[T]he prior existence of inherent 
judicial authority concerning a particular matter . . . [of proce-
dure] should, in any event, be irrelevant to the Court’s inter-
pretation of a Rule governing the matter.”234 Indeed, all agree 
that the Rules Enabling Act is delegated rulemaking authority 
from Congress—not a codification of inherent court power.235 
The Rules Enabling Act, furthermore, contemplates that major 
policy changes to the rules should be accomplished pursuant to 
the rulemaking process.236 Moreover, the committee process and 
notice-and-comment procedures that limit the Court’s ability to 
dictate the precise content of the rules have been required by 
Congress since 1988. The Court has not possessed a full-
throated, non-statutorily constrained license to control civil 
procedure by way of inherent authority since at least 1872.237 
Any suggestion that the Court is free to ignore the force of the 
 
 232. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United 
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 21, 23, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). 
 233. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) (footnote omitted). 
 234. Struve, supra note 10, at 1131. 
 235. Id. at 1125; see also Porter, supra note 10, at 175. 
 236. See Struve, supra note 10, at 1130 (“Accordingly, since the Enabling 
Act conditions the delegation of rulemaking power on the Court’s use of the 
prescribed procedures, it appears to require the Court to resort to those proce-
dures when seeking to change a Rule.”); see also Marcus, supra note 10, at 
933–36 (agreeing that the terms of the Rules Enabling Act are best understood 
to counsel interpretive restraint, but recognizing the limitations of a formal 
approach and the need for institutional analysis in this context). 
 237. See Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Proce-
dure: The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 392 (1935). 
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Rules, absent referral to the Advisory Committee, simply fails 
to acknowledge the commands of the Rules Enabling Act.238 A 
viable theory of Rules interpretation should therefore recognize 
that the Court’s delegated authority to make novel procedural 
policy in areas covered by the Rules is contingent on following 
the congressionally mandated rulemaking procedures.239 
Despite the clear statutory commitment to procedural rule 
creation via the Rules Enabling Act process, adherents of the 
inherent-authority model conclude that given the constraints 
that the Act imposes on the Court, “it is logical that the Court 
would use its most powerful tool—adjudication—to contribute 
its voice to the agenda and process.”240 To suggest that the dic-
tates of the Rules Enabling Act do not constrain the Court in 
Rules interpretation, however, is to reject the principle of insti-
tutional settlement. Application of this principle—“that deci-
sions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established 
procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding”241—in this con-
text is clear. Congress has duly established a process for prom-
ulgating rules of procedure. A basic commitment to institution-
al settlement, then, requires the Court to follow it. The 
inherent-authority model rejects the notion outright.242 For sim-
ilar reasons, the wholesale rejection of the Rules Enabling Act 
process in lieu of an unconstrained power to enact procedural 
policy pursuant to adjudication fails on rule-of-law grounds.243 
Given our primary thesis, it is important to emphasize that 
our claim is that dynamic statutory interpretation is unneces-
sary and inappropriate in this context, even if this approach is 
necessary or desirable in statutory interpretation.244 Dynamic 
 
 238. See supra note 223 (citing to Porter’s conclusion that it is both legiti-
mate and logical for the Court to set policy as an adjudicator). 
 239. We are not claiming, however, that dynamic interpretations of the 
Rules are ultra vires. Rather, our claim is that the Rules Enabling Act struc-
ture should be incorporated into the prevailing theories of Rules interpretation 
as a normative matter, and that this approach can be operationalized. Cf. Mul-
ligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, at 75 (explaining 
that our proposed model “is one premised on institutional competencies, not 
authority”). 
 240. Porter, supra note 10, at 147. 
 241. HART & SACKS, supra note 87, at 4. 
 242. See Porter, supra note 10, at 170 (recognizing the legitimacy of the in-
herent-authority model). 
 243. Cf. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 
YALE L.J. 1561, 1568–69 (1994) (arguing that the rule of law mandates some 
level of fidelity to authoritatively enacted statutory law). 
 244. Cf. Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democ-
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interpretation has a tendency to infuse statutes with equity 
when the most straightforward reading of the text could lead to 
injustice or results that are contrary to contemporary public 
norms. This approach is unnecessary in Rules interpretation 
because many rules incorporate equitable standards that spe-
cifically contemplate that lower courts will exercise their dis-
cretion to achieve the best results in each particular case.245 
Dynamic interpretation is also premised on recognition that 
Congress does not, and probably cannot realistically, keep 
many statutes up to date, and courts are relatively well-
positioned to update statutory policy when necessary to reach 
normatively desirable results in the cases they confront during 
adjudication. This approach is inappropriate in the context of 
Rules interpretation because there is a dedicated and focused 
cadre of rulemakers who are specifically charged with continu-
ously keeping the rules up to date, and this process can realis-
tically be initiated by the Court with mechanisms that would 
allow rule changes to be applied to pending cases.246 
Moreover, we believe that advocates of the inherent au-
thority model have been led astray by their tendency to equate 
any attempt to take the text of the Rules seriously with a rigid 
form of neo-textualism.247 This tendency is perfectly under-
standable, given that Moore and Bauer were both writing at 
the dawn of the new textualism, and they perceptively identi-
fied and criticized a discernible trend by the Court to apply this 
methodology of statutory interpretation to Rules interpreta-
tion.248 Meanwhile, Porter is part of a new generation who has 
come of age in an era when the most important lessons of 
textualism have been assimilated into the thinking of main-
stream judges and scholars, and where it is commonplace for 
even staunch critics of this theory to acknowledge that “we are 
all textualists now.”249 It is therefore not especially surprising 
 
racy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 245–49 (2013) (advocating “practical rea-
soning” in statutory interpretation). 
 245. See infra notes 253–69 and accompanying text. 
 246. See infra notes 306–15 and accompanying text (describing our pro-
posed “referencing” procedure). 
 247. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 10, at 171 (linking a textual commitment 
in Rules interpretation with Scalia-like “brittle textualism”). 
 248. Indeed, the Court continues to apply textualism at times in Rules cas-
es, as illustrated by Pavelic & LeFlore, Unitherm Food Systems, Shady Grove, 
and scores of other cases. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing these cases). 
 249. See Molot, supra note 6, at 36 n.157 (quoting Jonathan R. Siegel, 
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when Porter contends that a text-based interpretive approach 
to the Rules is at odds with their “equitable roots,” and that 
this approach tends “toward becoming hypertechnical and 
harsh” and thereby wrongly limits lower-court discretion.250 By 
contrast, in her view, the inherent authority approach, or what 
she labels “managerial interpretations,” are characteristically 
“imbued with a sense of flexibility and fairness.”251 
In reality, however, an interpretive approach to the Rules 
that looks to text as constraining often leads to a discretionary 
standard for lower courts.252 When lower courts are plainly au-
thorized to exercise equitable discretion in implementing the 
Rules, there is little need for the federal judiciary to engage in 
“dynamic statutory interpretation.” The Court may, however, 
properly add flesh to the bones of those discretionary standards 
or provide guidance regarding their outer parameters in appro-
priate cases by employing traditional tools of construction, or 
what we are calling “jurisprudential purposivism.” 
It is crucial to recall that the Rules aim to meld together 
law and equity practice as well as to codify many older common 
law practices that emerged from these separate systems.253 It 
should be no surprise, then, that as a matter of straightforward 
interpretation, many of the Rules themselves call for lower-
court discretion. As we have previously argued,254 our proposed 
model of civil rules interpretation embraces these lower-court-, 
equity-, and discretionary-focused Rules. Our view is therefore 
compatible with the use of intentionalist and purposive tools of 
construction that predominated shortly after the Rules were 
promulgated, and continue to form the core of statutory inter-
pretation for many scholars and judges.255 
Simply put, the respectful treatment of text in Rules inter-
pretation does not inevitably lead to a neo-textualist approach 
for the Rules any more than it does for statutes. For example, it 
 
Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 
1057 (1998)). 
 250. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, 
at 70–73. 
 253. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2; see also Clark & Moore, supra note 237, at 393. 
 254. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1227. 
 255. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 85 (2005) (contrasting “a 
literal text-based approach with an approach that places more emphasis on 
statutory purpose”). 
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is by no means radical to recall that in the Court’s view, 
“[a]nalysis of legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool 
of statutory construction. There is no reason why we must con-
fine ourselves to, or begin our analysis with, the statutory text 
if other tools of statutory construction provide better evidence 
of congressional intent with respect to the precise point at is-
sue.”256 Thus, the issue “in any problem of statutory construc-
tion . . . is the intention of the enacting body,”257 not necessarily 
the plain meaning of the text unadorned by the drafters’ pur-
poses or the like. 
Following this view, then, a drafting body, be it Congress 
or the Advisory Committee, may use equitable or discretionary 
terms without rendering an assessment of the parameters of 
those terms beyond the scope of traditional tools of statutory 
construction, as proponents of the inherent authority approach 
suggest.258 For example, the Court has explained that even 
though “Congress included no explicit criteria for equitable 
subordination when it enacted § 510(c)(1) [of the Bankruptcy 
Code], the reference in § 510(c) to ‘principles of equitable sub-
ordination’ clearly indicates congressional intent at least to 
start with existing doctrine,” and interpretation of equitable 
subordination under § 510(c), which calls for much lower-court 
discretion, is amenable to the “principles of statutory construc-
tion.”259 Indeed, the fact that a drafting body uses language 
such as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” to express a 
policy to be applied within a set of “complicated factors for 
judgment” does not necessarily render the provision beyond the 
scope of statutory construction, at least with respect to the out-
er parameters of those terms.260 
We see these principles at play in the Rules as well. Thus, 
for example, Rule 23 properly grants district courts broad dis-
cretion, yet appellate review may delimit the boundaries of this 
discretion.261 Moreover, as we illustrate below with the example 
 
 256. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote and citations omitted). 
 257. United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 53 (1942). 
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“[W]here a 
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 259. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1996). 
 260. FCC v. RCA Commc’ns, 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953). 
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of Rule 15,262 the Supreme Court’s crafting of more precise 
standards for a Rules’ term such as “as justice requires” is con-
sistent with deploying traditional tools of construction when 
the Court’s interpretation is furthering the purpose or intent of 
the drafters. 
Furthermore, despite contrary assertions by proponents of 
the inherent-authority camp,263 not all text-focused construc-
tions of the Rules call for a rigid, non-flexible, “the rule of law 
as a law of rules” approach264 that privileges appellate authority 
over lower-court discretion. A text-focused approach to Rule 
11(c)(1), for example, clearly illustrates that sanctions are dis-
cretionary.265 And this is but one example. Indeed, the Commit-
tee Notes to the 2007 amendments clearly state that the draft-
ers often intend lower-court discretion; moreover, this 
discretionary approach can be invoked by way of standard text-
focused interpretation whenever the drafters use the term 
“may.”266 Simply put, a textual commitment to Rules interpre-
tation often leads to lower-court discretion. 
It appears, then, that proponents of the inherent-authority 
model have thrown the baby out with the bath water. By erro-
neously conflating any commitment to text with “brittle 
textualism,”267 they are drawn to an unconstrained theory of 
Rules interpretation as the only alternative. This unbounded 
approach, however, ignores the dictates of the Rules Enabling 
Act—full stop! Such a view cannot be squared with the concept 
of institutional settlement. 
By rejecting this inherent-authority approach, however, we 
do not embrace a naïve faith in the Rule drafters’ ability to 
craft perfect regimes. We entirely agree that there are charac-
teristic problems with rules based on their imprecision and the 
limited foresight of lawmakers.268 Rules are therefore frequent-
 
 262. See infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text. 
 263. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175. 
 264. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175 (1989). 
 265. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanc-
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 266. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 2007 Advisory Commitee Notes (“The restyled rules 
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 267. See Porter, supra note 10, at 175. 
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ly ambiguous as applied to the facts of a particular case, and 
even when they have a seemingly plain meaning, rules can lead 
to absurd results that were not contemplated or intended when 
they were adopted by drafters.269 
As such, we do not advocate for a position that is against 
all adjudication-driven interpretation of the Rules. Such adju-
dication is frequently necessary to resolve the ambiguities of 
legal rules.270 Moreover, the promulgation of procedural policy 
though adjudication could potentially avoid the problems with 
rules in the first place because case-by-case decisionmaking is 
more flexible, dynamic, and incremental than rulemaking, in 
addition to being cheaper and easier to utilize in some circum-
stances.271 For these reasons, administrative law, among other 
areas, contains several doctrines that allow administrators to 
exercise equitable discretion and soften the hard edges of 
bright-line rules in particular cases.272 It is also widely under-
stood that even if administrative agencies use rulemaking to 
make most of their law and policy, they will inevitably need to 
conduct a certain amount of “residual adjudication.”273 None of 
these points, however, compel one to reject any and all textual-
ly constrained Rules interpretations. As explained below, how-
ever, they should counsel careful attention to the respective 
roles of lower and higher courts in Rules interpretation, as well 
as recognition of the preeminent position of the Advisory Com-
mittee in crafting novel procedural policy. 
B. REGIME-SPECIFIC PURPOSIVE MODEL 
The other leading scholarly approach resides with those 
who conclude that the Rules must be interpreted, systematical-
ly, in light of the drafters’ intent. These scholars, while recog-
nizing that the Court in interpreting the Rules does not face 
the same task as it does when interpreting a statute,274 never-
 
 269. See Manning, supra note 89, at 2388; Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Ab-
surdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006) (providing a theoretical defense of the ab-
surdity doctrine in statutory interpretation based on civic republican theory). 
 270. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 195 (3d ed. 2009). 
 271. See id. at 194–95 (describing the advantages of adjudication). 
 272. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of 
Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11126 (2002). 
 273. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270. 
 274. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 929 (recognizing that the principal-
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theless argue that taking a traditional statutory-construction-
like approach to Rules interpretation is best.275 These scholars, 
most notably Catherine Struve and David Marcus, argue that 
the structure of delegated authority under the Rules Enabling 
Act, as well as the normative considerations that flow from no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, necessarily constrain the Court. 
They follow the dictate that the “Rule must . . . be applied if it 
represents a valid exercise of Congress’s rulemaking authority, 
which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on 
this Court by the Rules Enabling Act,”276 leaving open the in-
terpretive question of what precisely any individual rule com-
mands. These scholars, thus, differ from the inherent-authority 
camp insofar as they insist that the Court faces bounded choic-
es when engaging with the Rules, and the Rules thus serve as a 
meaningful constraint. 
Recognizing that Rules cases present standard interpretive 
questions, both Struve and Marcus, contrary to the Court’s 
tendency toward a strict textualist approach to Rules interpre-
tation in its Rules-as-statutes cases, reject a neo-textualist per-
spective. This rejection follows from the unique normative 
starting point at play in Rules cases; namely, that the Court is 
not faced with an issue of legislative supremacy but is inter-
preting the work product of the judiciary itself. 
As such, Struve argues that even if one is otherwise a 
textualist as to statutes, in the Rules context one should look to 
purpose and intent as lodged in the Advisory Committee’s Offi-
cial Notes in the interpretive analysis.277 This position appears 
even stronger given that the Rules Enabling Act after the 1988 
 
agent metaphor that grounds much of the statutory construction debate is not 
applicable in Rules cases). 
 275. See id. (“[A]s a functional matter, a court should pursue the same in-
terpretive goal for the Federal Rules that the faithful agent concept recom-
mends for courts as they interpret statutes.”); Struve, supra note 10, at 1141 
(“Both the structure of the Enabling Act and the actual rulemaking process, 
then, counsel restraint in the interpretation of the Rules: the Court should not 
reject authoritative sources of meaning in favor of its own policy conception of 
a desirable Rule.”). 
 276. Burlington N.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). 
 277. See Struve, supra note 10, at 1103 (“[T]he Court should accord the 
Notes authoritative effect.”); id. at 1158 (“The fact that the Notes proceed 
through the approval process along with the text also helps to meet textualist 
objections to their use.”); cf. Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 81 (2015) (claiming that a textualist approach to interpreting administra-
tive regulations should include consideration of the regulatory preamble and 
other mandatorily created materials that were part of the public record when 
elected officials reviewed and approved the proposal). 
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amendments mandates both the creation of these notes and 
that these notes be promulgated contemporaneously with the 
text of the Rules.278 These mandates create a different interpre-
tive setting than most federal statutes, given that federal stat-
utes seldom come with interpretive instructions or extensive, 
official lawmaking records.279 Marcus refines this position ex-
plicitly to adopt a traditional purposive or intentionalist280 ap-
proach.281 
Their proposed approach is not entirely unprecedented. 
Similar regime-specific, purposive-approach arguments have 
been made regarding interpretation of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), for example.282 The UCC, like the Rules, lists its 
purposes283 and instructs courts to follow a purposive method of 
interpretation.284 Additionally, “the drafters provided a fuller 
 
 278. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2012). Specifically, this section requires that “[i]n 
making a recommendation under this section or under section 2072 or 2075, 
the body making that recommendation shall provide a proposed rule, an ex-
planatory note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body’s action, 
including any minority or other separate views.” Id. 
 279. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 570 (1985) (“Congress seldom provides explicit 
guidance, even in legislative history, on how it wishes courts to interpret stat-
utory language.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpreta-
tion and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 890 n.13 (2003) (“[P]ast history 
shows that it is most unlikely that Congress will enact rules of interpretation 
that will generally resolve the disputed issues of interpretive choice.”). While 
some scholars have argued that mandatory interpretive rules pose substantial 
problems in statutory interpretation, see Staszewski, supra note 91, not all 
share this view. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (arguing that Con-
gress has the constitutional power to mandate tools for interpreting federal 
statutes and that it would be wise to exercise that power). In any event, in this 
paper, we need not take a stand on this statutory question. Rather, our focus 
is on the unique setting of interpretation of the Rules which are promulgated, 
unlike statutes, with explanatory comments and statements of purpose. 
 280. We realize many distinguish these views, but in the Rules context 
they are often collapsed. 
 281. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 957. 
 282. See Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 
795, 797 (1978). 
 283. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM’N 2001) (“[U]nderlying 
purposes and policies [of this Act] are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize 
the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to permit the continued expan-
sion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the par-
ties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”). 
 284. Id. official cmt. (“The text of each section should be read in the light of 
the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, and also of [the Act] 
as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly 
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delineation of purpose in the Official Comments to individual 
[UCC] sections.”285 As a result “of the way in which the Code 
was constructed,” scholars conclude, “[UCC] litigation is a spe-
cial arena . . . [that requires] purposive interpretation of the 
Code.”286 In just the same way, the Rules, in Rule 1, lay out a 
purpose, “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”287 And, as with the UCC, the Rules state that 
“[t]hey should be construed and administered” to further this 
purpose.288 Finally, as with the UCC, the Rules are accompa-
nied with official comments that offer much in the way of dis-
closing the drafters’ intent and purpose. Thus, the potential 
application of a regime-specific purposive approach in the con-
text of a unique legal regime is not without precedent. Rather, 
it presents as a context-sensitive take upon the interpretive 
question.289 
Further, as the name implies, the regime-specific purpos-
ive approach to the Rules shares much with statutory purpos-
ive approaches. Purposive approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion are often seen as flowing from the legal process movement, 
which we also find key to interpretation of the Rules.290 Struve 
and Marcus’s approach, which looks to similar goals of the 
Rules drafters and seeks to further those ends in similar ways, 
fits solidly in this family of thought. 
As we have previously argued,291 when not facing policy-
change cases, we applaud the Court for taking a text-focused 
interpretive approach that embraces purposive reasoning. In 
Foman v. Davis,292 for example, the Court addressed when a 
district court could decline a motion for leave to amend a plead-
ing when the text of Rule 15 was not self-defining, although the 
intent of the drafters was sufficiently clear. The Court ap-
 
or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies 
involved.”). 
 285. McDonnell, supra note 282, at 800. 
 286. Id. at 801. 
 287. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Cf. Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of 
Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 817 (2002) (arguing that as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, courts should consider the legal context in 
which Congress enacts a statute). 
 290. See supra Part I.D. 
 291. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1227. 
 292. 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 
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proached the question of defining Rule 15’s then-drafted lan-
guage—“leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so 
requires’”293—by deploying a text-focused-interpretive strategy. 
The Court thus read Rule 15 as a part of the Rules as a 
whole.294 The Court, in this manner, interpreted the leave-to-
amend provision in Rule 15 vis-à-vis the general goals of Rule 1 
and the pleading standards established by Rule 8(a)(2), as then 
envisioned by Conley, and delineated several standards, such 
as futility or bad faith, for when an amendment should not be 
allowed.295 
We admire much in the regime-specific purposive model 
and think that this approach would generally work in the lower 
federal courts. This view is not ultimately satisfying, however, 
as the primary approach to civil rules interpretation for the 
Supreme Court. Most importantly, this view fails to account for 
the unique choice-of-policymaking-form question the Court fac-
es with Rules issues. While noting that the Rules lack a separa-
tion-of-powers component that drives much of statutory con-
struction, which negates any prima facie attraction to a 
textualist approach, proponents of the regime-specific purpos-
ive view continue to perceive Rules cases basically the same as 
if they involved statutes.296 Following this approach, proponents 
of the model contend that the Court has an obligation to inter-
pret the Rules, as it would with a statute.297 
The Court, however, just like an administrative agency, 
faces a choice of policymaking form that it does not face in 
statutory cases. Most statutes that delegate authority to agen-
cies to promulgate orders and rules leave it up to the agency to 
decide whether to make policy pursuant to rulemaking or adju-
dication. Agencies can therefore routinely choose whether to 
make policy decisions pursuant to rulemaking or adjudication. 
This decision is known in administrative law as an agency’s 
 
 293. Id. at 182 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)). 
 294. Id.; see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 
477–78 (1992) (stating that the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language 
is determined by reference to, among other things, the broader context of the 
statute as a whole). 
 295. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 
 296. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 942 (“Relationships among the various 
institutions involved in rule promulgation and interpretation—the Supreme 
Court, the lower federal courts, rulemaking committees, and Congress—and 
the values that these relationships create support an obligation to interpret.”). 
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“choice of policymaking form.”298 Since it is widely recognized 
that administrative agencies can make policy decisions through 
rulemaking or adjudication, an agency’s choice of policymaking 
form has received a great deal of attention in administrative 
law scholarship. This literature recognizes the “obvious point” 
that “the agency makes an important choice when it selects the 
policymaking form its actions will take.”299 An agency’s choice of 
policymaking form is important because rulemaking and adju-
dication have distinctive advantages and drawbacks as policy-
making vehicles. 
The Court faces just such a choice in Rules cases,300 which 
weighs against full-fledged adoption of the regime-specific pur-
posive model. First, the certiorari question itself is best viewed 
as a question of policymaking form.301 Cases involving the ap-
plication of equitable standards are best resolved initially—
and, for the most part exclusively—in the lower federal 
courts.302 This includes cases that require the lower courts to 
apply an equitable or discretionary standard to the facts of a 
particular case, which do not ordinarily require any high-court 
review as the Court does not function as an error-correction in-
stitution—a role better played by the courts of appeals.303 As 
such, typically it is best if the Court, in an act of policymaking 
form choice, dispenses with such review altogether—excepting 
those cases where a circuit split (or other indicia of cert-
worthiness) would require taking up the matter. Indeed, the 
 
 298. See Magill, supra note 38. 
 299. Id. at 1397. 
 300. Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, 
at 1205. 
 301. The Court sets its own agenda when it grants or denies certiorari. See 
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 221–22 (1991) (“Fundamentally, the definition of 
‘certworthy’ is tautological: a case is certworthy because four justices say it is 
certworthy. . . . [C]ertworthiness is ultimately subjective, changing, and unde-
finable . . . .”); Sanford Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence, and Certiorari, 79 
VA. L. REV. 717, 736 (1993) (reviewing PERRY, JR., supra) (“[I]t seems difficult 
indeed to read the Court’s own Rule 10 as anything other than an invitation to 
balancing, to the making of ‘political choice(s)’ about what is ‘important’ 
enough to demand the overt, highly visible intervention of the United States 
Supreme Court.”); see also Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Proce-
dure, supra note 10, at 1234. 
 302. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, 
at 82. 
 303. Cf. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME 
COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 
(1986). 
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percolation of such issues in the lower courts will often yield 
consensus, in which case Supreme Court intervention will typi-
cally be unnecessary.304 There will, however, undoubtedly be 
situations in which lower courts with a plurality of perspectives 
regarding the best manner of managing federal litigation will 
disagree about the proper resolution of an issue, in which case 
the Court may eventually want or need to intervene. This is es-
pecially so in cases where the party seeking certiorari is also 
seeking a procedural reform, as the denial of a grant for such a 
party constitutes a loss.305 But what is key is that interpreta-
tion by the Court is not an obligation—it is a choice. 
Of course the certiorari power is not unique to Rules cases. 
What is unique to Rules cases is the further choice-of-
policymaking-form option of resolution of Rules issues by the 
Advisory Committee. We have discussed in prior work the pro-
cess by which the Court can effectively refer matters to the Ad-
visory Committee after granting certiorari,306 and the stream-
lining of this process that could occur with the introduction of 
modest reforms.307 Even without statutory amendments, the 
Court could refer questions to the Advisory Committee by 
amendment to its own Supreme Court Rules.308 Thus, using the 
criteria the Justices might otherwise deploy for determining 
whether to grant certiorari,309 the Court could determine 
whether a particular Rules case merits high court review. At 
this stage, assuming the issue is “certworthy,” the Court could 
accomplish such a reference to the Advisory Committee by 
summarily granting the writ of certiorari, vacating the lower 
court opinion, remanding the case, and ordering a stay pending 
action by the Advisory Committee.310 Such a move would, in ef-
 
 304. See Ronald J. Krotozynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural 
Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1021, 1053 (2014) (describing the premium that the federal judi-
cial system places “on disparate decision makers all reaching the same conclu-
sion” in the lower courts). 
 305. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1234–35. 
 306. See id. at 1235–37. 
 307. See id. at 1237–40. 
 308. See id. at 1236. 
 309. See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, 
Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between Certiora-
ri and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7–16 (2008) (reviewing the papers of re-
tired Justices to determine what criteria the Justices employ in case selection). 
 310. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 345–49 
(9th ed. 2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s GVR practice). 
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fect, operate like a certification of a question from a court to an 
agency311 or from a federal court to a state court,312 insofar as 
the lower court is merely to await resolution of the question. 
Should a rule revision result from this process, the new rule 
would apply to the case in the court of appeals after the stay is 
lifted. Indeed, Rules revisions are regularly applicable to cases 
pending on appeal without retroactivity concerns.313 Further, 
this referencing approach follows administrative practice that 
recognizes that agencies have the discretion to stay adjudica-
tions to await the resolution of a rulemaking,314 as well as judi-
cial practice recognizing that courts have the discretion to stay 
proceedings to await the resolution of a rulemaking.315 Moreo-
ver, given that there is no constitutional right to an appeal in 
civil cases,316 nor a statutory right (in most cases)317 to Supreme 
Court review at all, the Court’s choice of a notice-and-comment 
 
 311. Cf. Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification 
of State-Law Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 197 (2010) 
(advocating for the expansion of certified questions from federal agencies to 
state courts). 
 312. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 4507 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing certification from federal to state 
courts). 
 313. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 
401 (Apr. 22, 1993) (providing an effective date for newly adopted amendments 
and directing that they “shall govern . . . insofar as just and practicable, all 
proceedings in civil cases then pending”). As such, revised rules apply on ap-
peal, even if the district court relied upon the pre-amended rule in its ruling. 
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1098 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (applying revised Rule 4(m) on appeal when the district court relied 
upon the pre-amended rule); see also Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to 
Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50–52 (2007) (arguing that congressional mod-
ification of civil statutes upon certification of a question from the Supreme 
Court would not run contrary to retroactivity prohibitions). 
 314. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(d) (2015) (providing that a petitioner who 
has filed a petition for rulemaking “may request the Commission to suspend 
all or any part of any licensing proceeding to which the petitioner is a partici-
pant pending disposition of the petition for rulemaking”); In re Tenn. Valley 
Auth. (Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 and 4), 68 N.R.C. 361, 430 
(2008) (recognizing that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had the discre-
tion to stay an adjudication until the parties could complete a rulemaking but 
declining to exercise that discretion), rev’d on other grounds, 69 N.R.C. (2009). 
 315. See DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE § 10.07[B] (5th ed. 
2010). 
 316. See Nat’l Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 
43 (1954). 
 317. The only mandatory appeal to the Court now comes from three-judge 
district court panels. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2015). All other appellate review is 
done by writ of certiorari. See id. §§ 1254, 1257. 
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venue as opposed to an adjudicatory one would not constitute a 
due-process injury to the parties. As such, every Rules case, in 
a rich sense, is best understood as a matter of choice by the 
Court—not obligation. 
The Marcus and Struve model fails to account for this fea-
ture of Rules cases and, as a result, fails to account for the ad-
vantages that flow from notice-and-comment rulemaking in 
Rules cases.318 Moreover, neglecting the issue of policymaking 
form runs contrary to the legal process theory’s focus upon in-
stitutional advantage as a key to constructing a well-run legal 
system.319 Having explored the advantages of civil rules rule-
making over Supreme Court adjudication in the past, we con-
cluded that there are at least four broad institutional ad-
vantages to rulemaking over adjudication in policy-change 
cases.320 First, rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication, is widely 
viewed as a better procedure for making policy and exploring 
issues of legislative fact precisely because informal rulemaking 
procedures are specifically designed for this purpose.321 Second, 
anyone who is interested can participate in rulemaking,322 
while adjudication is generally limited to the parties in a 
case.323 Third, the rulemaking method of making policy gives 
agencies greater control over their own agendas, allowing them 
to set priorities more easily and to implement their program-
matic responsibilities rationally and comprehensively.324 
 
 318. See infra notes 322–26 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra Part I.D (discussing legal process theory). 
 320. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1207–12. 
 321. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270, at 193 (“[T]he procedures of 
rulemaking have been designed for the precise purpose of exploring issues of 
law, policy, and legislative fact.”); see also 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8, at 369 (4th ed. 2002) (claiming that for this rea-
son, the product of rulemaking “almost certainly will be instrumentally supe-
rior to any ‘rule’ produced by the process of adjudicating a specific dispute”). 
 322. See David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in 
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 940 (1965) 
(recognizing that rulemaking is generally more accessible than adjudication). 
 323. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270, at 192–93; PIERCE, supra note 
321, § 6.8, at 368–69. 
 324. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 270, at 193–94; Ronald A. Cass, Models 
of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 394 (1986) (explaining that adju-
dication is generally understood to represent “a commitment to incremental 
resolution of problems,” while rulemaking “entails the comprehensive disposi-
tion of a large number of related claims”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Dis-
cretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) (recognizing 
that “[a]lmost every law tackles multiple problems at once,” and that in con-
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Fourth, rulemaking is also widely understood to be fairer than 
adjudication to groups who are adversely affected by agency ac-
tion, because newly established rules are prospective instead of 
retrospective and can be crafted to afford exceptions and the 
like.325 
We do not believe notice-and-comment rulemaking a pana-
cea, however. Rather, our point is that the overwhelming con-
sensus in administrative law is that rulemaking is generally 
superior to adjudication as the form for setting policy—warts 
and all.326 Moreover, as we have detailed before, these ad-
vantages of rulemaking generally apply to the court rulemak-
ing process.327 Both the inherent-authority and regime-specific 
purposive models forego these advantages in policy-change cas-
es, which comes at substantial loss.328 
III.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE MODEL OF CIVIL RULES 
INTERPRETATION   
We have, thus far, rejected the Court’s typical Rules-as-
statutes approach, with its separation-of-powers starting point, 
as inapposite for judiciary-drafted rules. We have also discard-
ed the inherent-authority approach as contrary to the principle 
of institutional settlement in light of the Rules Enabling Act. 
We also cast-off the regime-specific purposive model for failing 
to account for the essential choice-of-policymaking-form ques-
tion faced by the Court in Rules cases. In this section, then, we 
aim to sketch a positive case for the administrative agency 
model we espouse as the best interpretive theory for Rules cas-
es. In renewing and refining our prior position on this score, we 
 
trast to adjudication, “agencies can and do make multi-dimensional decisions” 
when they promulgate rules). 
 325. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 321, § 6.8, at 372–74 (“The primary pur-
poses of rules are to effect [sic] future conduct.”); Sunstein, supra note 268, at 
974 (recognizing that rules have a tendency to reduce “bias, favoritism, or dis-
crimination in the minds of people who decide particular cases”). 
 326. See PIERCE, supra note 321, § 6.8, at 368 (“Over the years, commenta-
tors, judges, and Justices have shown near unanimity in extolling the virtues 
of the rulemaking process over the process of making ‘rules’ through case-by-
case adjudication.”); see also Magill, supra note 38, at 1403 n.69, 1415 n.112 
(reviewing the formative literature on this topic and reporting that “the bot-
tom line” was that “agencies should rely on rulemaking much more often” than 
adjudication). 
 327. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1206–15. 
 328. Id. at 1240–51 (discussing the benefits of the rulemaking approach, 
including benefits to “the democratic legitimacy of lawmaking”). 
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first discuss our preference for rulemaking over adjudication in 
policy-change cases. Second, we address the proper role for the 
Court as an adjudicator when presented with Rules issues re-
solvable by traditional tools of purposive construction. Finally, 
we respond to some administrative law-inspired objections to 
our proposal, and explain why we believe that our model would 
result in a sound regulatory regime. 
A. PREFERENCE FOR RULEMAKING IN POLICY MATTERS 
We begin with our contention that in policy-setting mat-
ters, Rules issues should be resolved by the Advisory Commit-
tee. Key to this conclusion is that the Court acts as an adminis-
trative agency in relation to the Rules, as we have argued 
extensively in prior work:329  
While the analogy is not seamless,330 four key features demonstrate 
the similarity between administrative agencies and the Court in the 
civil procedure context, [which we believe noteworthy in interpreting 
the Federal Rules]. First, both agencies and the Court [in Rules mat-
ters] have delegated authority to make policy in their respective fields 
through orders entered in adjudication.331 Second, both agencies and 
the Court [in Rules matters] have delegated authority to make policy 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.332 Third, because the law 
does not typically compel these institutions to make policy through a 
particular procedural vehicle, both agencies and the Court [in Rules 
cases] routinely confront choice-of-policymaking-form decisions.333 
Fourth, the historical parallels, and accompanying ideas of legitima-
cy, between agency rulemaking and court rulemaking strengthen our 
thesis that the Court functions as an administrative agency in the 
field of civil procedure.334 
Following this administrative agency analogy, our model 
argues that the Court should implement or interpret the Rules 
as an agency would if it were following the widely accepted best 
 
 329. Id. at 1194–1205. Even our critics tend to agree with us on this point. 
See Porter, supra note 10, at 129–30 (recognizing that “recently other scholars 
have also analogized the Court to an agency, in order to demonstrate that the 
Court is insufficiently deferential to the rulemaking process,” and claiming 
that “the Rules much more closely resemble agency regulations” than stat-
utes). 
 330. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1205, 1205 n.98 (discussing the relevant differences). 
 331. See id. at 1205. 
 332. See Burbank, supra note 106, at 1025 (describing the Rules Enabling 
Act as a “delegation” of legislative power). 
 333. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1205. 
 334. Id.  
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practices on this topic.335 This administrative law analogy rests 
upon the Court’s choice of policymaking form—not the Court’s 
mere policy-setting function—as the core issue.336 Following 
this model, the Court, just as an agency would, should direct 
policy-change issues to the Advisory Committee for resolution 
by way of notice-and-comment rulemaking.337 Key to our view is 
our conclusion that the Court should avoid making civil-
procedure policy through its adjudicatory power and that major 
policy choices in this field should be made by referring any cert-
worthy, non-statutory-construction questions that emerge from 
the Court’s management of federal litigation to the rulemaking 
process. This proposed model is one premised upon institution-
al competencies, which is in line with the key insight from legal 
process theory that seeking institutional advantage as to the 
entity that resolves legal disputes is paramount.338 The position 
is that among the federal lower courts, the Supreme Court, and 
the Advisory Committee, when it comes to making major 
changes to the policies underlying the Rules, the Advisory 
Committee possesses institutional advantages such that there 
should be a presumption in favor of referral to that committee 
instead of setting policy by adjudication in the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, adherence to the process of referral to the Advisory 
Committee, as we discussed above, respects the important 
principle of institutional settlement as embodied in the Rules 
Enabling Act.339 
Consider Schlagenhauf v. Holder340 by way of example. 
Rule 35 allows district courts to order the physical or mental 
examination of a party over that party’s protest, if the stand-
ards of “in controversy” and “good cause” are met.341 Despite 
 
 335. While there may be a meaningful theoretical difference between “im-
plementation” and “interpretation,” see generally, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Agen-
cy-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard 
Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889 (2007) (dis-
cussing the potential distinction), we need not work out the nuances of this 
distinction here. 
 336. Administrative law scholars similarly find the choice of policymaking 
form a central question. For citations to this extensive literature, see Magill, 
supra note 38, at 1403 n.69; Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Pro-
cedure, supra note 10, at 1206 n.100. 
 337. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1212–15. 
 338. See supra Part I.D. 
 339. See supra Part II.A (critiquing the inherent authority view). 
 340. 379 U.S. 104 (1964). 
 341. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). 
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policy concerns regarding the potential for abuse, the 
Schlagenhauf Court held that “Rule 35 on its face applies to all 
‘parties,’ which under any normal reading would include a de-
fendant.”342 Dissenting, Justice Douglas concluded that even 
though the text mandated an application of Rule 35 to defend-
ants, such a rule was rife with risk for “blackmail.”343 Conclud-
ing that safeguards should be provided, he stated: 
This is a problem that we should refer to the Civil Rules Committee of 
the Judicial Conference so that if medical and psychiatric clinics are 
to be used in discovery against defendants—whether in negligence, li-
bel, or contract cases—the standards and conditions will be discrimi-
nating and precise. . . . Lines must in time be drawn; and I think the 
new Civil Rules Committee is better equipped than we are to draw 
them initially.344 
We contend that Justice Douglas got it right as to those in-
stances where the Justices harbor policy concerns with a rule. 
If the Justices disagree with the policy position embedded in 
the Rules, or believe a policy outcome was not considered by the 
drafters, then the appropriate course is to refer the matter to 
the Advisory Committee. This conclusion follows because the 
Advisory Committee, in matters of policy, holds all the institu-
tional advantages described above.345 These are the exact ad-
vantages Justice Douglas sought in the Rule 35 context. Thus, 
as the Court explicitly held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, if the Court be-
lieves that the clear text of a Rule will lead to poor policy out-
comes, relief “must be obtained by the process of amending the 
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”346 
We have seen a similar dynamic at play with Rule 11. Re-
call the Pavelic & LeFlore case we discussed above where the 
Court held, over a strong purposive dissent, that law firms 
could not be sanctioned under Rule 11.347 In 1993, the Advisory 
Committee re-drafted Rule 11 so that “a law firm is to be held 
also responsible . . . as a result of a motion under” Rule 11.348 
The amended Rule made full use of the institutional ad-
vantages of the Advisory Committee. First, the Advisory Com-
mittee conducted an extensive empirical review and considered 
 
 342. 379 U.S. at 112. 
 343. Id. at 127 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 344. Id. 
 345. See supra notes 320–25 and accompanying text. 
 346. 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 347. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989). 
 348. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
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multiple points of view.349 Second, in crafting the new rule, the 
Advisory Committee coupled the law-firm-liability reform with 
a then-new so-called “safe harbor” provision, which prohibits 
sanctions unless “within 21 days after service of the motion” 
the offending motion is not withdrawn.350 In an action that the 
Court as an adjudicator could never do, the Advisory Commit-
tee concluded that “it is appropriate that the law firm ordinari-
ly be viewed as jointly responsible under established principles 
of agency” if after notice and twenty-one days an offending mo-
tion has not been withdrawn.351 Similarly, in the aftermath of 
Twombly, many concluded that the Court was right to be con-
cerned with explosive discovery costs in anti-trust cases, but 
that it would have done better to refer the matter to the Advi-
sory Committee to craft new rules more carefully tailored to 
that specific problem, such as a proposed early motion for 
summary judgment, rather than changing all of pleading law 
by adjudication.352 All this is to say, nearly all agree that policy 
changes are better crafted by the Advisory Committee than by 
the Court sitting as an adjudicator.353 
 
 349. Id. (identifying the relevant studies that were considered). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 71, at 881–85 (discussing lower courts’ lim-
ited discovery, early summary judgment approach as well as noting that there 
are “legitimate screening concerns addressed by Twombly” but that the “Su-
preme Court is not the optimal institution to design a strict pleading rule”); 
Bone, supra note 139, at 889 (“[A] centralized, court-based, and committee-
centered process is well suited for making general constitutive rules that de-
fine the basic framework of a civil procedure system and more detailed rules 
that control particularly costly forms of strategic behavior.”); Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 67, at 850 (“It is entirely arguable that pleading should 
provide additional, and more vigorous, gatekeeping. But before discarding the 
pleading system that has been in place for many years, we ought to discuss its 
virtues and failures soberly and with the relevant information before us. The 
rulemaking bodies should have hosted that discussion.”); Spencer, supra note 
71, at 454 (“[T]he rule amendment process is preferable because it is a much 
more democratic, transparent, and accountable method of making changes to 
the Federal Rules.”); The Supreme Court 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 185, 305–15 (2007) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (“The majority, 
motivated by legitimate concern over the large costs that discovery places on 
defendants, had good intentions. But a judicial opinion is the wrong forum for 
enacting a major change to settled interpretations of the Federal Rules.”); Na-
than R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process: 
Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial Inter-
pretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 378–79 (2011) (“The Court is not well-
suited to making these policy decisions in the procedural context, especially 
compared to the formal rulemaking bodies.”).  
 353. We address this point exhaustively in prior work. See Mulligan & 
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B. RESOLUTION BY THE COURT AS AN ADJUDICATOR 
This is not to say that resolution of Rules questions by the 
Court sitting as an adjudicator is never appropriate. Indeed, 
just as an agency will often resolve discrete problems by adju-
dication or issue guidance, the Court should continue to ad-
dress non-policy-setting matters in Rules cases by way of adju-
dication. The Court should only decide such cases, however, 
when the issues are cert-worthy under the Court’s normal 
standards for making such determinations, and the case is ca-
pable of being resolved pursuant to traditional tools of purpos-
ive construction, by which we specifically mean to include non-
textualist tools of interpretation.354 We find that such matters 
fall into two broad camps, which we address in turn: (1) textual 
exegesis questions; and (2) equity standard-setting issues. 
1. Issues Explicitly Resolved by Rulemakers 
As we explained in Part I.D, the first element of any theory 
of Rules interpretation should be that the judiciary must re-
spect the principle of institutional settlement, which requires 
federal courts to follow the identifiable policy choices of the 
rulemakers. We recognize, however, that following this di-
rective may be easier said than done, and we have therefore 
borrowed from administrative law to provide concrete guidance 
regarding how courts should perform this task. 
Our approach, which calls for some cases to be routed to 
the Advisory Committee while others will be resolved by the 
Court as an adjudicator, demands a mechanism for making 
choices of policymaking form. In our prior work, we attempted 
to describe this mechanism for choosing between 
decisionmaking by the Advisory Committee or by the Court sit-
ting as an adjudicative body by way of three administrative law 
analogies.355 First, we argued that if a Rules case requires an 
interpretation that rests substantially upon legislative facts 
(i.e., “those [facts that] a tribunal seeks in order to assist itself 
in the legislative process of creating law or determining poli-
cy”356), as opposed to adjudicative facts (i.e., historical facts of a 
 
Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 1207–12. 
 354. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted 
only for compelling reasons.”); Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Pro-
cedure, supra note 10, at 1193. 
 355. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1215–34. 
 356. Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV. L. REV. 537, 549 (1949). 
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dispute the determination of which traditionally falls within 
the province of the jury357), the matter should be referred to the 
Advisory Committee. We so concluded because of the consensus 
among administrative law scholars that notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is the superior forum for unearthing legislative 
facts,358 especially in light of the courts’ well-known inability ef-
ficiently to create robust records that rely upon legislative 
facts.359 Similarly, we argued that the Court should refer Rules 
issues to the court rulemaking process when those issues would 
be resolved pursuant to the second step of a Chevron-like in-
quiry because they effectively involve policymaking, as opposed 
to those situations when the Court could resolve the interpre-
tive problem as a matter of law under Chevron step one by 
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction,”360 which 
specifically include purposive and intentionalist tools. Provid-
ing yet a third analogy, we looked to the distinction between 
legislative and interpretive rules in administrative law and ar-
 
 357. FED. R. EVID. 201(a); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 
224, 244 n.52 (5th Cir. 1976) (Brown, J., concurring) (citing Kenneth Culp Da-
vis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–16 (1942)). 
 358. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 244–45 
(5th Cir. 1976) (Brown, J., concurring) (“Though a court, with its adversary 
procedure, is not necessarily precluded from resolving issues of legislative fact, 
it is generally thought that their determination is particularly appropriate to 
the administrative process, where staffs of specialists and great storehouses of 
information are available.” (citation omitted)); PIERCE, supra note 321, § 6.4.3, 
at 326; Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 941 
(1980) (“A remand to an agency might often produce better results than a re-
mand to a trial court, because the trial court’s procedure is likely to be the 
same as it would be for finding adjudicative facts.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Ju-
dicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Ser-
vice for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1986) (“The conclusion 
is overwhelming that the Supreme Court lacks the essential institutional ar-
rangement for developing the legislative facts on which some of its lawmaking 
should rest.”).  
 359. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and 
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 37–38 (1978) (criticizing the Court’s han-
dling of issues of legislative fact in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Arthur 
Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, 
and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. 
REV. 1187, 1233–45 (1975) (suggesting ways to improve the Court’s means of 
legislative fact development); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Re-
ception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113 (1988) (discussing vari-
ous proposals to deal with the “haphazard way in which courts receive legisla-
tive facts”). 
 360. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
n.9 (1984). 
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gued that issues that could be decided as valid interpretive 
rules are appropriate for resolution pursuant to adjudication, 
whereas policy decisions that would effectively result in the 
creation of “legislative rules” should be referred to rulemaking. 
Our expectation was that these three analogies would work in 
concert to offer helpful advice in routing Rules questions either 
to the Court as an adjudicator or to the Advisory Committee. 
For those matters retained by the Court as an adjudicator, 
we, in league with the regime-specific purposive model, favor a 
purposive approach to Rules interpretation. We anticipate that 
the Court would rely heavily on the plain meaning of the text of 
the Rules and their broader legal and historical context to iden-
tify their purposes and constrain the scope of their permissible 
meaning,361 and we anticipate that the Advisory Committee 
notes would be a particularly fruitful resource for identifying 
the explicit policy choices of the rulemakers.362 We believe that 
objections to the use of legislative history in statutory interpre-
tation are obviated in this context by the fact that the Advisory 
Committee notes are required by the Rules Enabling Act, and 
they accompany a proposed rule throughout the course of the 
rulemaking process—and they are therefore readily available 
to other participants, elected officials, and the general public 
before a proposed rule can be finalized.363 The rulemaking pro-
cess also provides formal opportunities for participants to dis-
sent from the contents of the notes, and they cannot easily be 
 
 361. See supra Part I.D (describing the dual role of the statutory text in le-
gal process theory); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Er-
rors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 
(2001) (arguing that procedural statutes should be interpreted in light of 
background principles of law in the field of civil procedure which are discover-
able to federal courts with expertise in this area). 
 362. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 965–67 (arguing that the textualist cri-
tique of legislative history does not undermine the validity of “an inclusive 
method that permits courts to use a broad range of sources extrinsic to the 
text of the Federal Rules as they try to apply a rule consistent with rulemaker 
intent and purpose,” and recognizing that the advisory committee notes belong 
at the top of a hierarchy of rulemaking history); Struve, supra note 10, at 
1152–69 (claiming that the role of the advisory committee notes in the court 
rulemaking process demonstrates that they “possess distinctive claims to au-
thority, based both on the terms of the Enabling Act and on the practicalities 
of rulemaking”). 
 363. For similar reasons, Jennifer Nou and Kevin Stack both argue that 
regulatory preambles should be given substantial weight in the interpretation 
of federal administrative regulations from the perspectives of textualism and 
purposivism, respectively. See Nou, supra note 277, at 116–18; Stack, supra 
note 166, at 391. 
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manipulated because they receive careful attention at each 
stage of the process from people who can be expected to under-
stand and pay relatively close attention to the issues.364 We are 
therefore confident that the court rulemaking process creates a 
formal record that provides a rich source of information that 
would allow the federal judiciary to identify and implement the 
deliberate policy choices of the rulemakers in civil procedure 
cases. 
While our proposed model embraces some notable differ-
ences between the proper role of the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts in Rules interpretation—namely only the Court 
has the certiorari power and the ability to reference issues to 
the Advisory Committee—the disparities should be minimal 
when the rulemakers have explicitly resolved an issue. We con-
tend that lower federal courts, like the Supreme Court, should 
respect the text of the Rules and follow the ascertainable intent 
of the rulemakers. There will, however, be issues of first im-
pression, which will require lower federal courts to exercise 
some discretion in reasonably elaborating upon or extending 
the purposes of the rulemakers. It is also possible that circum-
stances could change substantially enough to create the func-
tional equivalent of unanticipated problems, and that lower 
federal courts, in matters where the Supreme Court has yet to 
act, may resolve those issues in a reasoned fashion that deviat-
ed from the original intent of the rulemakers.365 Generally 
speaking, however, we believe that all federal courts should re-
solve the civil procedure issues that arise during adjudication 
consistent with the identifiable policy choices of the 
rulemakers. Accordingly, our proposed approach to Rules in-
terpretation would respect the rule of law and the principle of 
institutional settlement. 
The pre-Twombly case of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.366 is 
illustrative. The issue here was whether, under Rule 8(a)(2), a 
 
 364. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (2015) (“In making a recommendation under 
this section or under section 2072 or 2075, the body making that recommenda-
tion shall provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a writ-
ten report explaining the body’s action, including any minority or other sepa-
rate views.” (emphasis added)). 
 365. Such rare instances of lower-court deviation from rule-maker intent, 
we believe tends to show the matter sufficiently ripe for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari and refer the issue to the Advisory Committee. When viewed 
in this context, we think such action a strength of our approach as lower-court 
deviation from rule-maker intent acts as a strong signalling device. 
 366. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
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complaint in an employment discrimination case must contain 
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination 
per McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.367 Engaging in a purpos-
ive analysis of the text, the Court held that such a heightened 
pleading requirement was not required. The Sorema Court 
turned first to the text of Rule 8(a)(2).368 It then examined the 
purpose of the rule, which it concluded was to establish a no-
tice-pleading regime.369 It then considered how “[o]ther provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably 
linked to” the drafter-created policy choice embedded within a 
notice-pleading regime.370 Thus, in cert-worthy cases which 
raise issues that can be resolved in a purposive fashion akin to 
Sorema, we conclude (as further elaborated below) that the Su-
preme Court as an adjudicator holds the institutional ad-
vantages over the Advisory Committee and lower courts in re-
gard to achieving legitimate, correct, and efficient dispositions. 
2. Elaboration and Application of Discretionary Standards 
There remains a distinct category of issues—the fine-
tuning of standards for lower-court equitable discretion—that 
is also readily amenable to resolution by the Supreme Court as 
an adjudicator. As explained above, the Rules merged law and 
equity,371 and numerous rules provide lower courts with equita-
ble discretion to achieve just results in particular cases. This 
discretion is conveyed in some instances by explicit grants of 
discretionary authority.372 Such discretion is also conveyed in 
many instances by the rulemakers’ choice of text. For example, 
the rules frequently require courts to “answer questions of de-
gree and relativity,”373 such as whether a “class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable,”374 or whether a 
proposed “amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted 
to be set out—in the original pleading.”375 
 
 367. Id. at 508 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973)). 
 368. Id. at 512 (quoting the Rule’s text). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 513. 
 371. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 373. Porter, supra note 10, at 164. 
 374. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 375. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 
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Our agency model fully embraces this equitable, fact-laden, 
and discretionary aspect of Rules interpretation and recognizes 
that the primary authority for making decisions in these areas 
properly rests with federal district courts. This distribution of 
authority comports with the underlying purposes and design of 
the Rules, and recognizes that district court judges are typical-
ly best situated to make such decisions based on their relevant 
experience and perspective. We think that the Supreme Court 
should rarely review such decisions, and that appellate review 
should ordinarily be limited to whether the district court 
abused its discretion. 
We further contend that it is sometimes appropriate for the 
Court to use adjudication to clarify how equitable standards 
should be applied as a general matter by lower courts—and 
that this function is compatible with a purposive method of 
Rules interpretation.376 The administrative law analogies that 
we initially proposed to distinguish policy-setting cases from 
cases that could be resolved pursuant to traditional tools of 
construction do not work particularly well in this context, how-
ever, because putting meat on the bones of these equitable 
standards could conceivably turn on legislative facts or require 
the resolution of Chevron-step-two-like ambiguity or even in-
volve the functional equivalent of a legislative rule.377 Our mod-
el therefore requires a different mechanism to distinguish ef-
forts to provide guidance to lower courts regarding the proper 
application or boundaries of discretionary standards, which we 
think is an appropriate function of adjudication, and the crea-
tion of novel procedural policy, which should once again be re-
ferred to the court rulemaking process. 
We think that the proper boundaries of the Court’s use of 
adjudication to provide equitable guidance should be deter-
mined by focusing on the type of reasoning to be deployed, as 
opposed to the precise nature of the question presented, and we 
therefore draw on other administrative law analogies to make 
this distinction. In each of our analogies, we are fundamentally 
aiming to route questions to the body best constituted to ad-
dress the matter. For example, our push to send legislative-fact 
matters to the Advisory Committee rests upon that institution’s 
superior ability to engage in broad empirical investigations as 
 
 376. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, 
at 70–73 (suggesting that such clarification is akin to an administrative agen-
cy’s general statement of policy). 
 377. See id. at 76–77. 
  
2017] CIVIL RULES INTERPRETIVE THEORY 2231 
 
compared to the Court sitting as an adjudicatory body.378 Such a 
focus upon institutional advantage, moreover, sits well within 
the legal process school as an expression of the philosophy’s fo-
cus on the structural features of the law.379 In crafting the 
mechanisms for effectuating choices of policymaking form, 
then, we continue to adhere to our main motivating principle: 
Rules matters should be resolved by the institution holding the 
most institutional competence vis-à-vis the precise decisional 
tasks presented. 
To this end, we adopt Randy Kozel and Jeffrey 
Pojanowski’s distinction between prescriptive and expository 
reasoning in administrative decisionmaking as helpful in the 
equitable-standard-setting context, even if not a perfect fit in 
every instance.380 Kozel and Pojanowski describe decisions that 
call for the weighing of evidence, utilizing technical expertise, 
and making value judgments as prescriptive, while decisions 
that call for an analysis of the drafter’s intent or the boundaries 
of judicial case law are defined as expository.381 Applying this 
distinction, Kozel and Pojanowski conclude that prescriptive 
reasoning—or what we have labeled as policy-change decisions 
in the Rules setting—constitutes one of the “core competencies” 
of notice-and-comment agency decision-making.382 
Seeking similar institutional advantages in the Rules set-
ting, if the resolution of a Rules dispute in a cert-worthy case 
would primarily hinge upon prescriptive reasoning (knowing 
full well that most cases will not solely involve one mode of rea-
soning or the other), then the dispute should go to the Advisory 
Committee because it has the stronger institutional capacities 
to take on such a task.383 Conversely, as Kozel and Pojanowski 
 
 378. See generally Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empiri-
cal Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002) (docu-
menting efforts since the late 1980s by the Advisory Committee to solicit and 
otherwise encourage empirical studies regarding proposed rule changes); see 
also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 67, at 859 (“The rulemakers should soon 
commence a study of exactly where . . . the optimal pleading standard lies.”); 
Sellers, supra note 352, at 366 (“[T]he Advisory Committee can commission 
research into the costs and benefits of a proposed amendment.”); Struve, supra 
note 10, at 1140 (similar); Leading Cases, supra note 352, at 313 (similar). 
 379. Fallon, supra note 179. 
 380. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 112, 143 (2011) (recognizing that the distinction between pre-
scriptive and expository decisionmaking is not always crystal clear). 
 381. Id. at 141–42. 
 382. Id. at 141. 
 383. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
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demonstrate, the appellate courts hold the institutional ad-
vantage when it comes to expository reasoning—i.e., deploying 
the traditional tools of statutory construction broadly conceived 
to include purposive and intentionalist approaches.384 Following 
this insight, we contend that in these cert-worthy cases, where 
the predominant mode of discourse will be expository—be it in 
implementing a relatively detailed rule-based regime or in fine-
tuning equitable standards for lower-court application—the 
Court should retain the matter for its own disposition sitting as 
a judicial entity. 
Consistent with our central focus on institutional compe-
tencies and with a new complementary analogy to administra-
tive law doctrine, we maintain that equity standard-setting 
cases should continue to be resolved by the Supreme Court in 
adjudication. Indeed, we think that when the Court provides 
guidance to lower courts regarding the proper application of the 
equitable standards set forth in the rules, the Court is provid-
ing the rough equivalent of “general statements of policy.”385 
This is partly the case because the Court is providing guidance 
to its subordinates regarding how it plans to interpret or apply 
the Rules in the future, and such guidance has informational 
value that helps to facilitate the consistent and predictable ap-
plication of the law in a context where the Court (or agency 
heads) could not feasibly review every decision. It makes sense 
to offer this guidance in adjudication, continuing the adminis-
trative law analogy, because agencies are similarly not re-
quired to use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when 
they provide such guidance.386 Finally, while such guidance 
channels discretion and provides the lower courts with useful 
information about the relevant factors that should inform their 
decisions when they implement the rules, the guidance does not 
change the substance of the rules or ordinarily dictate the re-
sult in any particular case.387 At the same time, however, the 
 
10, at 1221–27 (describing this same choice in terms of an analogy to Chev-
ron). 
 384. See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 380, at 149. 
 385. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedur-
al Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2011) (providing a 
helpful overview of the applicable law, and recommending deferential stand-
ards for judicial review of the validity of guidance documents). 
 386. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2015). 
 387. For these reasons, administrative guidance is not binding upon the 
public. Of course, the Court’s decision is binding precedent for lower courts as 
a matter of stare decisis. Again, we do not mean to suggest that this analogy is 
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adoption of the administrative agency model does not preclude 
deference to the lower federal courts in Rules cases. Rather, 
cases involving the application of equitable standards should be 
resolved initially—and, for the most part, exclusively—in the 
lower federal courts, as we have been emphasizing, and any 
high-Court review should be conducted under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard.388 
The foregoing division of responsibilities best promotes the 
competencies of each of the relevant institutional actors in 
Rules cases. Thus, the administrative model recognizes that 
there is little need to use notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cedures to address problems that can be resolved using tradi-
tional tools of purposive construction. Rather, courts are well-
situated to ascertain how the rulemakers previously decided 
such questions or to flesh out the contours of equitable stand-
ards during the course of adjudication. Accordingly, if the Court 
can use traditional tools of purposive construction to resolve an 
important dispute about the best understanding of the rules at 
issue, it should continue to use its adjudicatory authority to do 
so. If, however, the Court wants to change the controlling un-
derstanding of the rules (i.e., the underlying policy choice em-
bedded in a rule), the Court should refer the relevant questions 
to the Advisory Committee for resolution pursuant to the rule-
making process. Finally, allowing the lower courts to exercise 
predominant control over the equitable discretion that occurs in 
federal litigation provides a variety of institutional advantages 
as well. 
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard389 is illustrative of the approach we 
favor in equitable-standard-setting cases. The opinion inter-
preted Rule 23(d), which then stated that in “the conduct of 
[class] actions to which this rule applied, the court may make 
appropriate orders: . . . (3) imposing conditions on the repre-
sentative parties or on intervenors . . . [and] (5) dealing with 
similar procedural matters.”390 In an employment discrimina-
tion suit, the district court, pursuant to Rule 23(d)(3), entered 
an order prohibiting the parties and their counsel from com-
municating with potential class members without court ap-
 
perfect, but it does provide further evidence of the value of using administra-
tive law principles to inform the Court’s regulation of civil procedure. 
 388. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 10, 
at 82. 
 389. 452 U.S. 89 (1981). 
 390. Id. at 99. 
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proval.391 The Court reversed as an abuse of discretion.392 In so 
deciding, the Court first looked to “the general policies embod-
ied in Rule 23, which governs class actions in federal court.”393 
The Supreme Court also noted that because of the “potential for 
abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authori-
ty to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropri-
ate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties.”394 
Concluding, however, that this discretion must be bounded and 
subject to abuse of discretion review, the Court held that such 
“an order limiting communications between parties and poten-
tial class members should be based on a clear record and specif-
ic findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation 
and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.”395 
That is to say, taking a purposive interpretive approach, that is 
a hallmark of expository reasoning, the Supreme Court crafted 
equitable standards that furthered the policy choices enacted 
by the Advisory Committee. The Court further held that 
[o]nly such a determination can ensure that the [district] court is fur-
thering, rather than hindering, the policies embodied in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 23. In addition, such a 
weighing—identifying the potential abuses being addressed—should 
result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possi-
ble, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstanc-
es.396 
C. THE CIVIL RULES REGULATORY REGIME 
We have already responded in print to a number of stated 
or potential objections to our proposed model of Rules interpre-
tation,397 and we do not want to reiterate all of those points 
here. There is an underlying theme to these objections, howev-
er, that is worthy of brief discussion. The central concern is 
that the court rulemaking process has certain flaws that inhibit 
effective rulemaking, and as a result the Court should be em-
powered to circumvent this process. This concern has its own 
administrative law analogues, and while we will readily con-
 
 391. Id. at 93. 
 392. Id. at 102–03. 
 393. Id. at 99. 
 394. Id. at 100. 
 395. Id. at 101. 
 396. Id. at 101–02. 
 397. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1237–51; Mulligan & Staszewski, Institutional Competence, supra note 
10, at 84–90. 
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cede that the court rulemaking process is imperfect, we are 
unmoved by these objections for several reasons. 
We turn now to particular objections. The first counterar-
gument is that the court rulemaking process is “ossified,” which 
creates an incentive for the Court to make novel procedural pol-
icy through adjudication.398 This objection tracks the ossifica-
tion hypothesis in administrative law, which posits that be-
cause various analytic requirements and external review 
processes make notice-and-comment rulemaking too time-
consuming and expensive, regulatory agencies have strong in-
centives to make policy through less formal and participatory 
mechanisms such as interpretive rules, guidance documents, 
and adjudication.399 The parallel concern is that the promulga-
tion of new or amended civil rules currently takes roughly thir-
ty months,400 and innovations or changes cannot be adopted 
without the express or tacit approval of five different decision-
making bodies. Accordingly, if a majority of Justices think that 
major policy changes are warranted, it is far easier and more 
efficient for the Court to take the bull by the horns and adopt 
them pursuant to adjudication, particularly if those changes 
are likely to be controversial and generate potentially fatal ob-
jections during the rulemaking process. 
A second related objection is that the Court has limited 
control over court rulemaking, and this strengthens the incen-
tive for the Justices to make novel procedural policy pursuant 
to adjudication.401 This objection correctly recognizes that the 
Court functions as an administrator in the field of civil proce-
dure, but contends that this particular regulatory scheme is 
distinct from most administrative settings because the Justices 
have less control over final policy decisions than most agency 
heads. From an administrative law perspective, the regulatory 
regime in civil procedure could be viewed as one that is “bottom 
 
 398. Cf. Porter, supra note 10, at 182–83 (suggesting that our referencing 
proposal would overwhelm the Advisory Committee, and claiming that “even 
assuming the rulemakers could appropriately handle all of these questions, 
resource constraints, the lengthy rulemaking process, and a likely lack of con-
sensus would be serious obstacles to responsive reform”); Yeazell, supra note 
142 (noting that the contemporary rulemaking process has become more cum-
bersome with little added benefit). 
 399. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven 
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). 
 400. See McCabe, supra note 105. 
 401. See Porter, supra note 10, at 147. 
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up,” rather than one that is authoritatively controlled by agen-
cy heads (or their political principles) in a “top-down” fashion.402 
Justices who want to dictate policy outcomes in civil procedure 
will therefore naturally be prone toward making policy deci-
sions pursuant to adjudication (the part of the process that is 
effectively under their control), rather than deferring to court 
rulemaking. 
A third objection is that the court rulemaking process has 
become “politicized” in recent years and the resulting policy de-
cisions may therefore be excessively influenced by interest-
group pressure, rather than a result of “neutral expertise.”403 
Similar concerns of undue politicization have, of course, been a 
prominent theme in the administrative law literature in recent 
years.404 Whatever the proper cure for undue politicization in 
the administrative process (a tough issue, to be sure), one could 
argue that it is sensible for an independent Court to make pro-
cedural policy pursuant to adjudication, rather than deferring 
to the outcomes of a more overtly partisan political process. 
In response, we welcome rulemaking reforms. We are on 
record as seeking to reduce the current overly cumbersome 
drafting process to streamline its operation and encourage 
greater involvement by the Justices.405 In particular, we have 
advocated for the adoption of a three-step model that would in-
clude notice-and-comment rulemaking by the Advisory Com-
mittee, Court review, and Congressional report-and-wait. We 
have estimated that this process could be completed in a period 
of approximately eighteen months, and we have expressed hope 
 
 402. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1205 n.98 (“[T]he current court rulemaking model is best described as a 
bottom-up process, whereas agency rulemaking is traditionally described as a 
top-down process.”); Porter, supra note 10, at 147 (“Ironically, then, the 
Court’s position at the top of the administrative hierarchy effectively cuts it 
out of the process of initial revisions of Rules.”). 
 403. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of 
Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1561, 1612 (2008) (claiming that “the court rulemaking process has 
become increasingly politicized” since the 1980s, and that this development 
“has made it very difficult to revise the FRCP in general . . . because conflict-
ing interest group pressures tend to create Advisory Committee stalemate”); 
see also supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text (discussing these cri-
tiques). 
 404. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: 
Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671 (2012). 
 405. See Mulligan & Staszewski, Regulation of Civil Procedure, supra note 
10, at 1237–40. 
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that by eliminating the roles of the Judicial Conference and 
Standing Committee, and otherwise streamlining the court 
rulemaking process, the Court would be encouraged to revive 
its more active role in reviewing, evaluating, and contributing 
to potential changes to the Rules. We also agree with Brooke 
Coleman that membership on the Advisory Committee can, and 
should, be more representative of the bar and more attuned to 
typical cases as contrasted with high-stakes complex litiga-
tion.406 
Nonetheless, we do not believe that the foregoing objec-
tions—even without making these worthy reforms—provide a 
compelling basis for rejecting our proposed model of Rules in-
terpretation. First, criticisms of the court rulemaking process 
(whether valid or not) fundamentally miss the mark when not 
comparatively made. The relevant question is whether court 
rulemaking is a superior mechanism for making novel proce-
dural policy than Supreme Court adjudication, not whether the 
existing court rulemaking process (or, for that matter, Court 
adjudication) is perfectly ideal. Our claim is that court rule-
making in policy-setting matters (warts and all) is generally 
superior to Court adjudication (warts and all) for a host of rea-
sons. To our minds, a valid critique of our proposal would need 
to take the opposite position, not merely identify flaws with the 
existing rulemaking process. The choice of policymaking form 
in this context is a bounded one with only two alternatives—
and referral to a utopian “perfect” rulemaking process is not an 
option that is currently on the table. Thus, we reiterate the 
many advantages, as discussed above,407 that the notice-and-
comment approach to setting procedural policy enjoys. 
Second, those objections are, at bottom, merely a relatively 
sophisticated version of the argument for an inherent-authority 
model of Rules interpretation. The objections boil down to 
claims that court rulemaking takes too long and is inconven-
ient, and that it undermines the ability of the Justices to adopt 
their own preferred procedural policies. As Lonny Hoffman 
puts this family of critiques, the Court is saying “to rulemakers: 
out of my way. Can’t you see that modern litigation is totally 
different from what it was in 1938? Why haven’t you done 
something by now?”408 Wouldn’t it be less burdensome and more 
 
 406. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1049–51. 
 407. See supra notes 321–25 and accompanying text (outlining these ad-
vantages). 
 408. Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 
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efficacious for the Court to use adjudication to make novel pro-
cedural policy pursuant to common-law reasoning or a dynamic 
method of Rules interpretation? 
Well, sure, and this might therefore be a good idea—if the 
goal of civil rules interpretation was quickly and surely to im-
plement the procedural policy preferences of the Justices. As 
we have explained, however, the inherent-authority model is 
contrary to the scheme established by the Rules Enabling Act, 
inconsistent with rule-of-law norms, and incompatible with the 
principle of institutional settlement.409 Moreover, the court 
rulemaking process has epistemic advantages, in addition to 
promoting democracy and treating litigants more fairly. Ac-
cordingly, we believe that the benefits of presumptively using 
court rulemaking to make novel procedural policy easily out-
weigh the costs of constraining the Justices’ ability unilaterally 
to impose their own views of sound procedural policy pursuant 
to adjudication. 
Finally, and relatedly, we think the existing regulatory 
scheme for civil procedure has significant advantages, even if it 
departs from standard administrative law models or falls short 
of a romanticized ideal. We agree, of course, that the regulatory 
regime for civil procedure departs from a pure top-down model 
in the sense that the Justices cannot impose their own policy 
preferences over the objections of other participants in the pro-
cess. In particular, the Justices cannot amend the Rules with-
out the positive efforts and endorsements of the Advisory 
Committee, Standing Committee, and Judicial Conference. 
Meanwhile, however, the regulatory regime for civil procedure 
departs from a pure bottom-up model in the sense that the Jus-
tices, or the Chief Justice in particular, do appoint the mem-
bers of these relevant committees, have final adjudicatory au-
thority, and the ability to reject proposed amendments they do 
not favor. Nonetheless, our proposed model of Rules interpreta-
tion anticipates that the bulk of policymaking discretion should 
be exercised by lower federal courts and the Advisory Commit-
tee in a bottom-up fashion. This would effectively result in a 
“hybrid” regulatory regime that contains both top-down and 
bottom-up elements and matches the actual competencies of 
each of the relevant institutional actors. 
 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1512 (2013). 
 409. See supra Part II.A (critiquing the inherent-authority model). 
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While we believe it inappropriate to reject our proposal 
merely because court rulemaking falls short of a romanticized 
ideal, we also think that our proposal is strengthened by com-
paring the court rulemaking process with notice-and-comment 
rulemaking by many other agencies. First, the implicit notion 
that the Court sitting as an adjudicator, while surely speedier 
than the Advisory Committee, is freer of bias or more prone to 
empirical rigor than the Advisory Committee is simply spe-
cious. Both the Justices410 themselves and the Supreme Court 
bar411 are archetypes of elites, which carries all the biases at-
tendant therewith.412 Furthermore, just as with charges against 
the Advisory Committee,413 the Court often relies upon non-
empirically based, politically charged factual assumptions in 
setting procedural policy,414 yet it lacks the notice-and-comment 
check to counterbalance such errors. While we cannot provide a 
full-fledged comparison here, and further empirical work to 
evaluate our impressions would be helpful, we are confident 
that the court rulemaking process is a relatively vibrant one, 
and that “politicization” of this process, to the extent it has oc-
curred,415 is therefore less detrimental than it would be in many 
other contexts. As discussed above, the Advisory Committee’s 
proposals tend to generate a tremendous amount of commen-
tary from judges, attorneys, scholars, and the general public.416 
Moreover, this commentary tends to be relatively well-
informed, and to reflect relatively balanced views from a varie-
 
 410. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience 
and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 903 (2003); Patrick J. Glen, Harvard and Yale Ascendant: The Legal 
Education of the Justices from Holmes to Kagan, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
129 (2010); Timothy P. O’Neill, “The Stepford Justices”: The Need for Experien-
tial Diversity on the Roberts Court, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 701 (2007). 
 411. See Coleman, supra note 145, at 1015–19. 
 412. See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judici-
ary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 141 (2013); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judi-
cial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2011). 
 413. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 414. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 67, at 848–49; Herrmann et 
al., supra note 70, at 150–52. 
 415. While there is a widespread perception that court rulemaking has be-
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companying text, we are skeptical that the “golden age of rulemaking” was 
apolitical or that the Advisory Committee’s decisions were solely a function of 
“neutral expertise.” Rather, this perception may be influenced in part by the 
fact that today’s rulemaking process is significantly more openly participatory 
and transparent than in the past. 
 416. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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ty of competing perspectives, including those of trial attorneys, 
the defense bar, and other interested parties. Finally, the Advi-
sory Committee tends to be responsive to major comments or 
suggestions by providing reasoned explanations for its deci-
sions and, in many cases, amending its proposals as a result. 
While administrative rulemaking plainly runs the gamut, 
agencies have been heavily criticized for deficiencies in each of 
these areas in recent years.417 We think that court rulemaking 
fares relatively well in each of these areas, and that it is even a 
context where the requirements of “interest group representa-
tion” theory could conceivably be met.418 In any event, even if 
court rulemaking falls short of being “one of the greatest inven-
tions of modern government,”419 we think that it is a relatively 
sound rulemaking process—and, more important for present 
purposes, that it is a superior mechanism for making civil pro-
cedure policy than Supreme Court adjudication. 
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, we argued that civil rules interpretive theo-
ry should be recognized as a distinctive field of scholarly in-
quiry and judicial practice. In this endeavor, we described the 
existing theories of Rules interpretation that are set forth in 
the nascent scholarly literature, and advocated an administra-
tive model of Rules interpretation. More broadly, we conclude 
that our views on Rules interpretation illustrate that the best 
form of interpretation depends on legal context, the nature of 
the lawmaking process, and the competencies of the relevant 
institutional actors.420 We hope, therefore, that this Article will 
help to stimulate other legal scholarship and more thoughtful 
 
 417. For a recent analysis of public participation in rulemaking and the 
level of responsiveness by agencies to various types of comments, see Nina A. 
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judicial engagement with the emerging field of Rules interpre-
tive theory. 
Indeed, we believe that recognizing civil rules interpretive 
theory as a distinctive field of inquiry raises a host of interest-
ing, important, and previously unexplored questions. For ex-
ample, it may be worthwhile to consider whether the oft-
recognized distinction between “interpretation” and “construc-
tion” could perform a potentially useful role in this setting.421 
Moreover, it is also worth considering whether our proposed 
administrative model of Rules interpretation should be extend-
ed to the contexts of the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because both sets of Rules 
are adopted by the federal judiciary pursuant to delegations of 
authority under the Rules Enabling Act, they should not be 
treated the same as statutes for purposes of interpretive theo-
ry. On the other hand, those rulemaking processes could in-
volve special characteristics or norms that would suggest cau-
tion in simply adopting our administrative model without 
appropriate modifications. For example, criminal procedure is 
rife with constitutional concerns that would need to be consid-
ered when adopting an interpretive methodology for that par-
ticular legal context.422 
Similarly, it is worth considering how our proposed method 
of civil rules interpretation should be synthesized with the fed-
eral judiciary’s obligation to interpret federal procedural stat-
utes. Federal statutes reference the Rules often423 (including 
the codification of the Rules for bankruptcy practice).424 Wheth-
er codifications of these rules change the separation-of-powers 
foundation that supports the interpretation of these rules in 
those contexts is a question worthy of consideration. Similarly, 
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many federal statutes, such as transfer of venue statutes, work 
in conjunction with the Federal Rules, even though they lack 
explicit cross-references.425 Again, these regimes raise interest-
ing interpretive questions given the blending of the normative 
foundations upon which these competing rules rest. 
Finally, it is worth considering how civil rules interpretive 
theory ought to work in the states, which have a variety of dif-
ferent approaches for enacting rules of civil procedure for their 
courts, and where the rules of civil procedure interact with pro-
cedural statutes in a host of different ways. To begin, “[m]ost 
states’ rules now mirror the Federal Rules, and the rest have 
been pulled toward the Federal Rules in significant ways. In 
every state, federal rulemakers have exerted an extraordinary 
gravitational pull on state rulemakers.”426 Importantly for our 
study, while many states have adopted their rules by judicial 
rulemaking,427 many other states adopted the Federal Rules by 
statute—not judicial rulemaking.428 We believe that it could fol-
low from our argument that statute-adopting states should ap-
proach their civil rules as statutes (contrary to our conclusions 
about the Federal Rules), while those states adopting the Fed-
eral Rules by court order should approach interpretation in a 
manner akin to the one advocated here. Further, we believe 
that the persuasive authority of federal precedent may be ques-
tioned when there are mismatches of enacting schemes be-
tween state and federal systems. While we do not venture any 
definitive views on these or other related topics here, we do be-
lieve that jurists and scholars should start to think about pre-
paring for battle in a whole different set of possible interpretive 
wars. 
 
 425. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (2012). 
 426. Dodson, supra note 11. 
 427. See, e.g., ALASKA CT. R., R. CIV. P. (adopted by Sup. Ct. Ordinance 5, 
October 9, 1959); see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in 
State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003) (conducting a fifty state survey of proce-
dural rules). 
 428. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R. CIV. P.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., R. 
CIV. P.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-200 (2016); see also Oakley, supra note 427. 
